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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“If my answers frighten you, Vincent, then you should cease asking 
scary questions.” — Jules Winnfield1 
A police interrogation can be an unnerving and unsettling 
experience—one that often produces frightening answers.  Imagine 
you are “swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, 
surrounded by antagonistic forces,”2 deprived of the comforts of your 
home, cut off from the support of loved ones,3 and locked with a 
stranger in a depressing, windowless room4 for hours at a time5 while 
1. PULP FICTION (Miramax Films 1994).  In the scene, Jules Winnfield 
(Samuel L. Jackson) is speaking at a diner booth with Vincent Vega (John Travolta). 
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).   
3. See, e.g., id. at 449-50 (“‘In [the suspect’s] own home he may be confident, 
indignant, or recalcitrant.  He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant 
to tell of his indiscretions of criminal behavior within the walls of his home.  
Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their presence lending moral 
support.’” (quoting CHARLES E. O’HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION 99 (1956))).   
4. See, e.g., United States v. Broughton, No. 13-CR-164 (KAM), 2013 WL 
5744473, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2013) (“[The officer and suspect] moved to a 
private examination area, a ten foot by ten foot room, with one door, no windows, a 
desk, chair and bench.”); People v. White, 828 N.W.2d 329, 347 n.4 (Mich. 2013) 
(Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (“I believe that it is far more realistic and reasonable to 
conclude that most people would not perceive a one-on-one ‘discussion’ with a 
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the stranger wages a war of attrition with your psyche using 
“psychological ploys.”6  Other strangers come and go, some wearing 
suits and others with uniforms, guns, badges, and handcuffs.7  These 
unfamiliar people assure you, promise even, that you will feel better8 
if you just admit that you “did it.”9 
Later, a uniformed man places a gun on the table in front of you, 
claiming your fingerprints are all over it10 and that your “partner” 
homicide detective in a windowless police interrogation room to be a completely 
civil conversation.”). 
5. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 495-96 (interrogating a suspect over at least 
a sixteen-hour period in custody before warnings is unconstitutional), rev’g 
Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965); Hill v. United States, 858 
A.2d 435, 439 (D.C. 2004) (holding suspect for approximately three and a half hours 
before speaking with him); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 451 (“[The investigator] 
should interrogate for a spell of several hours . . . . In a serious case, the 
interrogation may continue for days, with the required intervals for food and sleep, 
but with no respite from the atmosphere of domination.” (quoting O’HARA, supra 
note 3, at 112)). 
6. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 451, 457 (“‘[The investigator] must interrogate 
steadily and without relent, leaving the subject no prospect of surcease.  He must 
dominate his subject and overwhelm him with his inexorable will to obtain the 
truth.’” (quoting O’HARA, supra note 3, at 112)).   
7. See id. at 457 (“This [interrogation] atmosphere carries its own badge of 
intimidation.”). 
8. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 692 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Ohio 1998) (“engag[ing the 
defendant] in casual conversation” deemed “simply looking out for Tucker’s well-
being” and not interrogation); Baker v. State, 956 S.W.2d 19, at 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1997) (asking suspect if he was sure he didn’t want to get “this thing . . . . off his 
chest” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Sargent, 762 P.2d 1127, 1128 
(Wash. 1988) (telling suspect that he would only benefit from mental counseling if 
he “c[a]me to the truth with himself” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
9. See, e.g., In re K.A., 60 A.3d 442, 445 (D.C. 2013) (“According to [one 
suspect], the officers ‘started making rude comments towards us saying . . . . one of 
you obviously did it.’”); State v. Guayante, 663 P.2d 784, 785-86 (Or. Ct. App. 
1983) (“[The officer] testified that he told defendant, ‘Look, we already know you 
did it.  Here is the stuff you took from him.’  Defendant said, ‘Yes, I did it.’”). 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 186 F. Supp. 2d 971, 973 (E.D. Wis. 
2002) (“The detective also told defendant that his fingerprints had been found on the 
firearm and the cocaine.  This statement was false.”); People v. Haley, 96 P.3d 170, 
183 (Cal. 2004) (“[D]etective told defendant, in effect, that ‘he knew he did it 
because his fingerprint was found at the scene.’”). 
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already “fingered you as the triggerman.”11  Is he lying?12  The man 
then places a duffel bag of cash, the apparent loot from the robbery, 
on the table mere inches from you.13  How are they so sure that you 
are the right person?14  Your head aches, your eyes hurt from the 
infernal fluorescent lights, you are drained of energy, and sapped of 
the will to resist.  The closest thing to a meal you had since morning 
was a candy bar, a cigarette, and a can of soda.15  The gun and money 
lie motionless, taunting you, whispering, “Did you do it?  You did it, 
didn’t you?”  Desperate, hopeless, and terrified, you cave in if for no 
other reason than to put an end to the elaborate ruse: “Ok, ok.  I did 
it.” 
And with that short admission, you seal your fate.  With the 
confession, you become the most damning possible witness against 
yourself. 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 340 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(informing defendant that another suspect had “named [defendant] as the 
triggerman” was not interrogation); People v. Kowalksi, 584 N.W.2d 613, 621 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (“informing defendant that codefendant . . . had given a 
statement did not constitute interrogation”).   
12. See, e.g., Shedelblower v. Estelle, 885 F.2d 570, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(informing suspect that his accomplice had been arrested and that the victim had 
identified the suspect—even though that latter statement was untrue—held not to be 
interrogation). 
13. See, e.g., Drury v. State, 793 A.2d 567, 571 (Md. 2002) (placing a tire iron 
and a garbage bag of stolen magazines obtained from robbery investigation in front 
of suspect).   
14. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450 (1966) (“[T]actics [used 
in custody] are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is 
but an elaboration of what the police purport to know already—that he is guilty.  
Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and discouraged.”); see also Michael 
Lewis, Did Goldman Sachs Overstep in Criminally Charging Its Ex-Programmer?, 
VANITY FAIR (Sept., 2013), available at http://www.vanityfair.com/ 
business/2013/09/michael-lewis-goldman-sachs-programmer (“‘It appeared [the 
officers] had a very strong bias from the very beginning.  They had goals they 
wanted to fulfill.  The goal was to obtain an immediate confession.’”) (quoting 
Sergey Aleynikov, a computer programmer interrogated by the FBI for taking 
source code from Goldman Sachs). 
15. See, e.g., Rodgers, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 972 (giving suspect a candy bar and 
a soda after suspect said “he was hungry”); Hill v. United States, 858 A.2d 435, 439 
(D.C. 2004) (offering suspect a soda); State v. Tucker, 692 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ohio 
1998) (giving defendant “a cigarette and a soft drink, in an effort to calm him 
down”). 
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“A defendant’s confession is probably the most probative and 
damaging evidence that can be admitted against him, so damaging that 
a jury should not be expected to ignore it even if told to do so.”16  For 
this reason, the law of confessions is one of the most important and 
controversial areas of American law.17  Police habitually push legal 
boundaries to obtain confessions, perhaps rightly so.18  Accordingly, 
police, attorneys, and judges should yearn to know with some 
certainty the lawfulness of the psychological ploys depicted in the 
preceding dramatization. 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to be free 
from self-incrimination.19  The Supreme Court delineated the extent of 
this powerful privilege in Miranda v. Arizona,20 one of the Court’s 
16. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 292 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) (White, J., 
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.  Law enforcement officials’ handling of the 
Boston terror bombing suspect in early 2013 showed how the extent of suspects’ 
rights under Miranda strikes a chord with the media and the public.  See Adam 
Goodman, How the Media Have Misunderstood Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s Miranda 
Rights, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 22, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
national/archive/2013/04/how-the-media-have-misunderstood-dzhokhar-tsarnaevs-i-
miranda-i-rights/275189/; Charlie Savage, Debate Over Delaying of Miranda 
Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/us/a-
debate-over-delaying-suspects-miranda-rights.html.  In the end, authorities 
questioned the arrestee for sixteen hours before reading him his Miranda rights, 
invoking the “public safety exception” under New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 
(1984).  Mark Sherman, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Miranda Rights Timing Sparks Legal 
Questions, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/04/25/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-miranda_n_3159287.html. 
18. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187-88 (1977) (“Indeed, 
far from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if 
not coerced, are inherently desirable.”); Laura Hoffman Roppe, Comment, True 
Blue?  Should Police Be Allowed to use Trickery and Deception to Extract 
Confessions, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 761 n.154 (1994) (“Some pressure in 
interrogation is, of course, necessary to achieve the desired result.”); see also Lewis 
v. Florida, 486 U.S. 1036, 1036 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
19. “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439-42 (1966) (“We granted certiorari 
in these cases in order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, 
of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and 
to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to 
follow.” (citations omitted)). 
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most well-known decisions.21  Miranda ruled that statements obtained 
from “custodial interrogation” are inadmissible without prior warnings 
apprising a suspect of his or her rights and a subsequent waiver of 
those rights.22 
The Supreme Court addressed the “interrogation” part of 
“custodial interrogation” for the first time in Rhode Island v. Innis.23  
In Innis, the Supreme Court officially extended the prohibition against 
confessions obtained from interrogation by express questioning24 to 
those obtained by the “functional equivalent of interrogation”: “words 
or actions on the part of police . . . that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect.”25  However, Innis also suggested that Miranda’s concept of 
“‘[i]nterrogation’ . . . must reflect a measure of compulsion above and 
21. See Richard L. Budden, Comment, All in All, Miranda Loses Another Brick 
From Its Wall: The U.S. Supreme Court Swings Its Hammer in Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, Dealing a Crushing Blow to the Right to Remain Silent, 50 WASHBURN 
L.J. 483, 488 (2011) (“The Miranda case is well known in criminal procedure as the 
leading source of rules pertaining to police interrogation.”); Russell Dean Covey, 
Miranda and the Media: Tracing the Cultural Evolution of a Constitutional 
Revolution, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 761, 761 (2007) (“Not only did television make the 
Miranda warnings famous, its adoption of Miranda as an icon of criminal procedure 
may be the main reason Miranda is good law today.”) (footnote omitted); see also 
Daniel Yeager, Rethinking Custodial Interrogation, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2-3 
(1990) (“Few cases have triggered as expansive a collection of case law and 
scholarly commentary, not to mention barroom, streetcorner, and living-room 
discourse.”); discussion infra Part II.B. 
22. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  Notably, the Miranda prohibition only applies 
to the use of statements in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.  Id.  The implication is 
that such statements are admissible for other purposes.  Id. 
23. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 293-97 (1980).  Police arrested Innis 
as a suspected sawed-off shotgun-toting assailant of taxicab drivers.  Id.  While 
transporting Innis to the station, the officers conversed about the dangers the missing 
gun may have posed to handicapped children who went to school in the area (were it 
hidden nearby).  Id.  Innis spoke up and took the officers back to the shotgun.  Id.  
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the officers had interrogated Innis 
in violation of his rights under Miranda.  Id. at 296-97 (referring to State v. Innis, 
391 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1978)). 
24. Id. at 300; infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
25. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (footnotes omitted).  Innis also provided an 
exception for “words or actions . . . normally attendant to arrest and custody.”  Id.  
See also discussion infra Part II.B. 
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beyond that inherent in custody itself.”26  It was unclear whether this 
utterance amended an additional coercive element to interrogation,27 
or merely contrasted statements obtained via interrogation with 
completely “[v]olunteered statements.”28 
Whatever the purpose of the remark, the Innis opinion produced a 
perplexing result in light of the Court’s incipient definition: police 
officers did not interrogate Innis when they discussed the danger that 
his missing shotgun posed to nearby handicapped schoolchildren.29  
With this seemingly innocuous “above and beyond” dictum and the 
peculiar result, the Supreme Court clouded any clarity that may have 
been gleaned from Innis regarding the limits to the “functional 
equivalent of interrogation.”30 
Going forward, Innis launched the debate over interrogation on 
two different trajectories: one forbidding apparently benign police 
conduct because it is the functional equivalent of interrogation; and 
another accepting police tactics that appear to prompt incriminating 
responses yet lack a measure of compulsion beyond custody itself.31  
On one side are the adherents of the Court’s purported rule in Innis, 
the “likely to elicit” definition.32  On the other side are courts that 
follow substantially the same definition but with an additional element 
drawn from the “above and beyond” dictum of Innis.33  This note 
26. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300. 
27. See id. at 300 (“Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the 
Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.” 
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478)); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 545 (White, J., 
dissenting) (“Today’s decision leaves open such questions as . . . whether [the 
accused’s] statements were spontaneous or the product of interrogation . . . .”).  See 
also infra note 131. 
28. Miranda, 384 U.S at 478. 
29. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-04; see also discussion infra Part II.B.   
30. See Yeager, supra note 21, at 47 (“The Court’s own standard seemingly 
would encompass the very tactics resorted to in that case. . . . [Innis] offered no 
guidance as to how reviewing courts, prosecutors, or defenders should prospectively 
distinguish the precise measure of compulsion which implicates Miranda from the 
subtle coercion that does not.”) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). 
31. See discussion infra Parts III-IV.  
32. See infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
33. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300.  Not every court interpreting the law in a 
manner that is incompatible with the “likely to elicit” definition explicitly credits the 
“above and beyond” language, but these results are nonetheless attributable to the 
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labels the latter interpretation the “custody plus” definition, because it 
requires custody plus an additional measure of compulsion not 
inherent in custody itself.34 
These contrasting interpretations produced rampant uncertainty in 
lower courts,35 prompting Justice White to write a dissent from denial 
of certiorari in Lewis v. Florida that illustrated the confusion and 
division.36  Since Lewis, inconsistency has persisted over the legality 
of law enforcement’s more exotic practices.37  Despite the disparate 
results, the Supreme Court has been hesitant to revisit Innis and assist 
courts and police by resolving the dispute, leaving the question of 
interrogation as an exceptionally “slippery” fish in the “murky” 
swamp of Miranda.38 
history of courts interpreting Innis in accordance with either the “likely to elicit” or 
“custody plus” paradigm.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
34. See Lewis v. State, 509 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).  Therefore, 
it is easier for police to show that a defendant voluntarily relinquished information 
in compliance with Miranda when a court uses the “custody plus” interpretation of 
Innis.   
35. See discussion infra Parts III-IV. 
36.   
I would grant certiorari to consider the construction of Innis rendered by 
the court below and to resolve the significant disagreement on this general 
issue among the state and federal courts, which has led those courts both 
to handicap the police in pursuing some apparently legitimate law 
enforcement practices and to approve the use of other ploys that have 
nothing to do with the usual and accepted procedures for arresting and 
charging a suspect. 
Lewis v. Florida, 486 U.S. 1036, 1036 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari to Lewis v. State, 509 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)). 
37.  See discussion infra Part IV.  “Law enforcement” is “society’s formal 
attempt to obtain compliance with the established rules, regulations, and laws of that 
society . . . . The concept . . . encompasses all levels (federal, state, and local) of the 
executive branch of government.”  JAMES CONSER, REBECCA PAYNICH, & TERRY 
GINGERICH, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1-3 (3d ed. 2013).  This 
note refers to those responsible for law enforcement—and thus subject to 
Miranda—generally as “police,” “law enforcement officials,” and “officers,” or, 
when appropriate, “detectives,” “agents,” “park rangers,” or whatever state actor 
term is appropriate in context.  See id. at 3. 
38. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 316 (1985) (describing the question 
of “custody” as “slippery” and Miranda in general as “murky”).  But see id. at 359 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Miranda is only “slippery” and “murky” 
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Because the two contrasting definitions extractable from Innis 
have created a baffling trail of cases in American state and federal 
courts,39 the Supreme Court’s repeated refusal to consider cases 
contemplating the issue is puzzling.  Could endorsing either the 
“likely to elicit” or the “custody plus” definition of interrogation have 
severe consequences on the law of confessions and day-to-day police 
work?  Would reaffirmation of the “likely to elicit” definition prohibit 
many uncoercive police tactics accepted in numerous U.S. 
jurisdictions?  Does the “custody plus” definition greatly undermine 
the policies behind Miranda?  The questions raised by interrogation 
under Innis may be scary, but over thirty years after Innis it is the lack 
of answers that is more frightening. 
Part II traces the growth of “interrogation” from generic 
“questioning” to the broader definition espoused in Rhode Island v. 
Innis.  This background discusses Miranda v. Arizona, whose deep 
roots provide the formidable constitutional foundation for “express 
questioning and its functional equivalent.”  Part III describes the two 
conflicting interpretations of “interrogation” Rhode Island v. Innis 
produced: the “likely to elicit” definition and the “custody plus” 
definition, described in Justice White’s dissenting opinion in Lewis v. 
Florida.  Part IV outlines how these opposing interpretations have 
produced discrepancies in lower courts over which psychological 
ploys by police qualify as “interrogation.”  Finally, Part V argues that 
the “likely to elicit” definition of interrogation should displace the 
“custody plus” definition because the latter diverges from 
“compulsion” as understood in Miranda.  Part V urges the Supreme 
Court to revisit Innis and hold that “interrogation” is “express 
questioning . . . [and] any words or actions on the part of the 
police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response.”40 
“because the Court’s opinion [in Elstad] threaten[ed] to become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy”).   
39. See discussion infra Part IV. 
40. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. 
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II.  MIRANDA AND INNIS: THE ORIGINS OF “INTERROGATION” AND ITS 
“FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT” 
A. Miranda v. Arizona transformed the law of confessions while 
discussing the types of interrogation tactics that were objectionable to 
the Supreme Court 
One could scarcely imagine a more persuasive piece of evidence 
positing a defendant’s guilt than his or her own confession.  A full 
confession along the lines of, “I did it and this is how,” is one of the 
most complete and nearly insurmountable suggestions of guilt.41  But 
skeptics who lack compassion for the accused may overlook that the 
term “confession” includes any incriminating response,42 which in the 
hands of a skilled prosecutor is virtually any statement from a 
suspect.43 
The law of confessions implicates two very strong competing 
values: catching bad guys (and gals) on the one hand and loyalty to 
the privilege against self-incrimination on the other.44  It is easy to 
41. See supra note 16.  Probably the only piece of evidence more convincing 
than a complete confession is a videotape of the suspect committing the crime.  See, 
e.g., Lewis, 509 So. 2d at 1236.  But in Lewis, the police officers were apparently 
uncomfortable relying on a videotape without a confession, as they used a videotape 
of the suspect committing the crime to obtain a confession.  Id. 
42. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 (“We conclude that the Miranda safeguards 
come into play whenever . . . . the police should know [they] are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response . . . .” (citation omitted)).   
43. Id. at 301 n.5 (“By ‘incriminating response’ we refer to any response—
whether inculpatory or exculpatory—that the prosecution may seek to introduce at 
trial.”); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966) (“[N]o distinction 
may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely 
‘exculpatory.’  If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of 
course, never be used by the prosecution.  In fact, statements merely intended to be 
exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to 
demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove 
guilt by implication.  These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of 
the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver 
required for any other statement.”).  Because the prosecution may seek to introduce 
any incriminating response, and both inculpatory and exculpatory statements are 
incriminating in any meaningful sense, it necessarily follows that a “confession” is 
practically any response in custody.  
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  “[O]ur accusatory system of criminal justice 
demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence 
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have an almost overwhelming indifference to the plight of criminals, a 
sect of society that does little to garner sympathy or compassion.  But 
the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination is one of the 
nation’s “most cherished principles.”45  Lest we forget, the Bill of 
Rights protects the rights of both the accused and the guilty, and to 
think the former is synonymous with the latter is an affront to the 
American notion of justice.46 
But the ability to interrogate a suspect by way of express 
questions or other tactics is an essential element of criminal 
investigation.47  Consequently, the law of confessions has become a 
vast and ubiquitous aspect of the criminal justice system, one 
regulated in great part by the Fifth Amendment.48  Unenviably, the 
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient 
of compelling it from his own mouth.”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (citing Chambers 
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940)); see also id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting) 
(“More than the human dignity of the accused is involved [in our system of criminal 
justice] . . . . [S]ociety’s interest in the general security is of equal weight.”). 
45. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458. 
46.   
The determination [of a confession’s voluntariness] must not be 
influenced by an irrelevant feeling of certitude that the accused is guilty of 
the crime to which he confessed.  Above all, it must not be influenced by 
knowledge, however it may have revealed itself, that the accused is a bad 
man with a long criminal record.  All this, not out of tenderness for the 
accused but because we have reached a certain stage of civilization.  
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 200 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled 
in part by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).  
47. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1963) (“[S]ecret and 
incommunicado detention and interrogation . . . are devices adapted and used to 
extort confessions from suspects. . . . Such questioning is undoubtedly an essential 
tool in effective law enforcement.”); see also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 325 
(1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing a confession as “the vital evidence . . . 
which is useful or necessary to obtain a conviction”); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 
U.S. 778, 796 (2009) (“Without . . . confessions, crimes go unsolved and criminals 
unpunished.”).  But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481 (“Although confessions may play 
an important role in some convictions, the cases here before us present graphic 
examples of the overstatement of the ‘need’ for confessions.”). 
48. Confessions are supplementally regulated by the Sixth Amendment’s right 
to counsel, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and 
rules of evidence.  See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 159 (1986) (state 
rules of evidence); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) (Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) 
(Sixth Amendment). 
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Supreme Court faces the challenging task of interpreting the Fifth 
Amendment and writing the rules in the high stakes game of 
confessions. 
The literature expounding Miranda v. Arizona is plentiful and 
voluminous,49 and the decision itself is on any list of classic Supreme 
Court cases.50  For better or worse, Miranda revolutionized the law of 
confessions51 and set the stage for any subsequent discussion of 
confessions.  Prior to Miranda, courts used a voluntariness analysis to 
determine whether confessions were admissible.52  To dispense with 
this custom, Chief Justice Warren found it “essential” to examine the 
“nature and setting” of custodial interrogation and how it threatened 
49. See Yeager, supra note 21, at 2; e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona 
and the Legal Mind: Formalism’s Triumph Over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 243 (1987); Stephen Allen Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: 
Constitutional Law or Judicial Fiat?, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1986); Yale Kamisar, 
Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is “Interrogation”?  When Does it 
Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1 (1980).   
50. See JETHRO K.  LIEBERMAN, MILESTONES: 200 YEARS OF AMERICAN LAW 
vii (1976) (selecting Miranda as the fourth most important moment in U.S. legal 
history).  Other examples include Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); 
and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  
51. See L. BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW & POLITICS (1985); Covey, supra 
note 21; Erik Luna, Constitutional Road Maps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1125, 1151 (2000) (quoting Yale Kamisar, The Miranda Warning Takes a Body 
Blow, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at B7); Mark Tushnet, Observations on the New 
Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1627, 1627 (2006).  
But see Carol S. Steicker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure?  Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996); George 
C. Thomas III, “Truth Machines” and Confessions Law in the Year 2046, 5 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 215, 218 (2007) (arguing “Miranda was not a revolution.  It was a 
compromise”); George C. Thomas III, Through a Glass Darkly: Seeing the Real 
Warren Court Criminal Justice Legacy, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2005).   
52. Under the voluntariness doctrine, confessions were admissible as long as 
the suspect made them voluntarily, as determined by the totality of the 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 462-65; id. at 503-04 (Clark, J., 
dissenting); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); see also Ashcraft v. 
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Welsh 
S. White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States 
v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209, 1209-10 (1980). 
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the protection against compelled self-incrimination.53  The Court was 
not exclusively focused on physical brutality, police violence, or other 
tactics of the “third degree.”54  Rather, the Court “stress[ed] that the 
modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically, rather 
than physically, oriented.”55 
The Miranda majority emphasized the importance police placed 
on using psychological domination to extract confessions.56  
Contemporary police manuals taught psychological stratagems and 
praised their effectiveness against suspects.57  These police tactics 
were sophisticated and thoughtfully crafted to obtain a confession 
from a suspect through psychological domination.  Moreover, these 
psychological tactics were taught in interrogation manuals.58  By way 
of these psychological “ploys” and “tricks,” investigators were able to 
“induce the subject to talk without resorting to duress or coercion.”59  
The manuals touted isolation as the “principal psychological factor 
contributing to a successful interrogation”60 and encouraged 
exploiting suspects’ vulnerabilities and weaknesses.61  Now familiar 
53. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. 
54. See id. at 445-448.  Specifically, Chief Justice Warren mentioned “beating, 
hanging, [and] whipping.”  Id. at 446.   
Not only does the use of the third degree involve a flagrant violation of 
law by the officers of the law, but it involves also the dangers of false 
confessions, and it tends to make police and prosecutors less zealous in the 
search for objective evidence.  As the New York prosecutor quoted in the 
report said, “It is a short cut and makes the police lazy and 
unenterprising.” 
Id. at 447 (quoting IV NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, 
REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 5 (1931)). 
55. Id. at 448. 
56. Id. at 448-61. 
57. See id. at 448-50.  “The subject should be deprived of every psychological 
advantage. . . . In his own office, the investigator possesses all the advantages.  The 
atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces of the law.”  Id. at 449-50 
(quoting O’HARA, supra note 3, at 99).   
58. See, e.g., FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND 
CONFESSIONS (4th ed. 2001) (1962); O’HARA, supra note 3; HAROLD MULBAR, 
INTERROGATION (1951); WORTH R. KIDD, POLICE INTERROGATION (1940). 
59. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 451-52. 
60. Id. at 449 (quoting INBAU ET AL., supra note 58, at 1). 
61.   
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to cable or movie viewers of police procedurals, the Court alluded to 
the “Good Cop-Bad Cop,” “friendly-unfriendly,” or “Mutt and Jeff” 
routine.62  Chief Justice Warren described tactics such as coached 
line-ups63 and reverse line-ups,64 remarking that “interrogators 
sometimes are instructed to induce a confession out of trickery.”65 
It was in this vein that Chief Justice Warren discussed “the evils 
[interrogation] can bring.”66  He concluded that police safeguards 
taken prior to a confession were insufficient to “insure that the 
statements were truly the product of free choice.”67  In Chief Justice 
Warren’s view, compulsion encompassed any type of deception used 
in custody.68  The atmosphere created by the incommunicado, 
carefully-constructed, psychologically-manipulated environment 
“carrie[d] its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not 
physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human 
dignity.”69 
Like other men, perhaps the subject has had a bad family life, had an 
unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited desire for 
women.  The officers are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of 
the offense, to cast blame on the victim or society.  These tactics are 
designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but 
an elaboration of what the police purport to know already—that he is 
guilty.  
Id. at 450 (footnotes omitted). 
62. Id. at 452. 
63. “The witness or complainant (previously coached, if necessary) studies the 
line-up and confidently points out the subject as the guilty party.”  Id. at 453 
(quoting O’HARA, supra note 3, at 105-06). 
64. The accused is identified in a reverse line-up by “‘fictitious witnesses’” for 
crimes different from the offense under investigation in the hope that he or she will 
“‘become desperate and confess to the offense under investigation in order to escape 
from the false accusations.’”  Id. at 453 (quoting O’HARA, supra note 3, at 106).   
65. Id.  Chief Justice Warren discussed several other psychological devices to 
demonstrate their pervasiveness, such as offering the suspect legal excuses for his 
actions, using circumstantial evidence to negate a suspect’s self-defense explanation, 
pointing out the incriminating significance of the suspect’s refusal to talk, 
persuading the suspect out of exercising his or her constitutional rights, and 
humiliating a suspect by undressing him.  Id. at 451-55, 452 n.17. 
66. Id. at 456. 
67. Id. at 457. 
68. See id. at 456-58. 
69. Id. at 457. 
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Concluding that these devious maneuvers in custody 
“commence[d]” “our adversary system,”70 the majority banned the use 
of statements obtained from custodial interrogation without police first 
giving warnings and receiving a waiver.71  Despite elaborating on 
several custodial taboos, the Court neglected to define “interrogation” 
within the grammar of “custodial interrogation.”72  In its rule, the 
Court referred only to “questioning” and “interrogation” generically 
without defining with any precision what these terms incorporated.73  
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White drew attention to this and 
other shortcomings of the Court’s ruling, anticipating that the 
70. Id. at 478.  
71. This is the Miranda rule.  Id. at 444.  “Prior to any questioning, the person 
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make 
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to presence of an 
attorney, either retained or appointed.”  Id. at 444.  The suspect’s right to remain 
silent has to be scrupulously honored once the suspect properly invokes this right, 
which means halting interrogation.  Id. at 478.  Any further interrogation is 
charmingly known as “badgering.”  Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990); 
see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). 
72. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436-99; see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 
291, 298-99 (1980) (“[R]eferences throughout the opinion to ‘questioning’ might 
suggest that the Miranda rules were to apply only to those police interrogation 
practices that involve express questioning of a defendant while in custody.  We do 
not, however, construe the Miranda opinion so narrowly.”). 
73. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (“If the individual indicates in any 
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, 
the interrogation must cease.” (emphasis added)); id. at 474 (“Without the right to 
cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual 
to overcome free choice.” (emphasis added)); id. (“[Police] may refrain from 
[providing counsel] without violating the person’s Fifth Amendment privilege so 
long as they do not question him during that time.” (emphasis added)); id. at 477 
(“The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to 
the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to 
police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way.” (emphasis added)); id. at 478 (“To 
summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to 
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.” (emphasis 
added)); id. at 483 (“Over the years the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
has . . . advis[ed] any suspect or arrested person, at the outset of an interview, that he 
is not required to make a statement . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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supposed “bright line” rule created by Miranda would inspire a 
counterproductive amount of confusion and uncertainty.74 
Summarily, the Miranda majority found the interrogation setting 
comparable to an overwhelming home field advantage in sports.  
American justice is a game, and when police and criminal suspects are 
opponents what inevitably follows are winners and losers.75  
According to Miranda, the advantage is so one-sided on law 
enforcement’s home field that even facing the opponent on this turf 
violates the spirit of the game.76  To offset the lack of competitive 
74.  
 At the same time, the Court’s per se approach may not be justified on 
the ground that it provides a “bright line” [rule] . . . . Today’s decision 
leaves open such questions as whether the accused was in custody, 
whether his statements were spontaneous or the product of interrogation, 
whether the accused has effectively waived his rights, and whether 
nontestimonial evidence introduced at trial is the fruit of statements made 
during a prohibited interrogation, all of which are certain to prove 
productive of uncertainty during investigation and litigation during 
prosecution.  
Id. at 544-45 (White, J., dissenting). 
75. The adversarial nature of the American legal system demands that police 
engage in the “the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”  Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).  This “competitive enterprise” pits police 
officers against suspects much like opponents in a sporting event.  See also Montejo 
v. Louisiana 556 U.S. 778, 806 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he purpose of 
the Sixth Amendment is to protec[t] the unaided layman at critical confrontations 
with his adversary . . . .” (second alteration in original) (quoting Michigan v. 
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); McNeil v. 
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991) (obtaining uncoerced confessions is an 
“unmitigated good,” and if courts excluded them “society would be the loser”); 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (“Our distrust for reliance on 
confessions is due, in part, to their decisive impact upon the adversarial process.”); 
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 459 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(mentioning the “the inherently adversarial relationship between a suspect and a 
policeman”).  See generally Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and 
Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 3 
(A. Howard ed. 1965). 
76. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58 (“The current practice of incommunicado 
interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation’s most cherished principles—that the 
individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself.”).  
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balance, police must remind the opponent of the rules.77  Otherwise, 
the home team cannot start the game.78  Suspects may choose to strap 
up and kick off the contest after being made aware of the rules.79  But 
only after suspects voluntarily say “game on” may the final score be 
counted against them in the win-loss column.80  It is with this 
understanding that the Court created the categorical rule against 
incriminating statements obtained without prior warnings “to dispel 
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.”81  It is only these 
warnings that restore the competitive balance suspects lack82 on law 
enforcement’s home field: the “interrogation environment.”83 
B.  The Supreme Court formally addressed the “interrogation” prong 
of “custodial interrogation” for the first time in Rhode Island v. Innis, 
finally defining interrogation as understood in Miranda 
As lawyers and judges are inclined to do, they quickly put the 
seemingly simple Miranda rule through the rigors of intense legal 
scrutiny.84  Because the Supreme Court failed to outline what 
77. See id. at 467 (“In order to combat these pressures [inherent in custody] 
and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights . . . .”). 
78. See id. at 479 (“But unless and until . . . warnings and waiver are 
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of 
interrogation can be used against [the individual].”). 
79. See id. 
80. See id.  
81. Id. at 458.  There are exceptions where the Miranda rule does not forbid 
the use of evidence obtained via custodial interrogation, but these exceptions should 
not (but sometimes do) change the analysis of whether “interrogation” occurred in 
the first place.  See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (confidential 
informant); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (routine-booking 
exception); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety exception). 
82. See supra note 71. 
83. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457 (“It is obvious that such an interrogation 
environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the 
will of his examiner.”).   
84. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mercier 302 A.2d 337 (Pa. 1973); State v. 
Cunningham, 379 A.2d 860 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); State v. Travis, 360 
A.2d 548 (R.I. 1976).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court “erroneous[ly]” relied on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in a right to counsel case to determine if police had 
interrogated Innis.  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980) (referring to 
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constituted “interrogation” in Miranda—and the cases decided in the 
opinion focused on the lack of procedural safeguards rather than what 
qualified as interrogation—lower courts had no illuminating insights 
from which to draw a coherent definition of interrogation.85  
Following Miranda, the Court’s jurisprudence on the “custody” prong 
of custodial interrogation rapidly expanded to help explain that half of 
the analysis.86  But it was not until 1980 that the Supreme Court 
finally decided the meaning of “interrogation” in Rhode Island v. 
Innis.87 
The dispute in Innis stemmed from comments the defendant made 
in response to a conversation between two officers while they 
transported him to the police station.88  Before it could analyze 
whether police violated Innis’ right to be from compelled self-
incrimination, the Court had to “first define the term ‘interrogation’ 
under Miranda.”89  The Court noted Miranda’s bare references to 
“questioning” in its definition of custodial interrogation, but refused to 
find that the Miranda safeguards applied only to instances of express 
questioning.90  The litany of police practices referenced in Miranda 
the court’s reliance in State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158, 1161-62 (R.I. 1978), on Brewer 
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)); see also cases cited infra note 85. 
85. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491-93 (Ernesto Miranda was “questioned by 
two police officers” in an interrogation room), rev’g State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721 
(Ariz. 1965); id. at 493-94 (“[A] detective questioned Vignera” about a robbery at 
squad headquarters), rev’g People v. Vignera, 207 N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1965); id. at 
494-97 (FBI agents “began questioning Westover . . . [after] he had been in custody 
for over 14 hours and had been interrogated at length during that period [by Kansas 
City police].”), rev’g Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965); id. at 
497-99 (Police “interrogated” Stewart nine times over five days, including once 
where “he was confronted with an accusing witness.”), aff’g People v. Stewart, 400 
P.2d 97 (Cal. 1965).   
86. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 3-6 (1968); Orozco v. Texas, 
394 U.S. 324, 326-37 (1969); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976); 
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977). 
87. Innis, 446 U.S. at 297 (“We granted certiorari to address for the first time 
the meaning of ‘interrogation’ under Miranda v. Arizona.”). 
88. Id. at 293-97; see also discussion infra Part II.C. 
89. Innis, 446 U.S. at 298. 
90. According to the Court in Innis:  
[T]he [Miranda] Court observed that “[b]y custodial interrogation, we 
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has 
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in 
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demonstrated that the Court’s sole worry was not statements 
punctuated with question marks.91  Rather, the Court’s concern was 
“that the interrogation environment created by the interplay of 
interrogation and custody would subjugate the individual to the will of 
his examiner and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination.”92  The Court reasoned, “it is clear that these 
techniques of persuasion, no less than express questioning, were 
thought, in a custodial setting, to amount to interrogation.”93  In this 
light, the Court concluded: 
[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in 
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional 
equivalent.  That is to say, the term “interrogation” under Miranda 
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or 
actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.94 
At last, here was a workable definition to determine “whether [the 
accused’s] statements were spontaneous95 or the product of 
interrogation.”96  Justice Stewart reiterated that the objective analysis 
will depend on what officers should have known would be the result 
any significant way.”  This passage and other references throughout the 
opinion to “questioning” might suggest that the Miranda rules were to 
apply only to those police interrogation practices that involve express 
questioning of a defendant while in custody.   
 We do not, however, construe the Miranda opinion so narrowly.  
Id. at 298-99 (emphasis and third alteration in original) (citations omitted).   
91. See supra Part II.A. 
92. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 300-01.  Hereinafter, the term “interrogation” signifies “express 
questioning or its functional equivalent,” as is the proper understanding of 
“interrogation” in Innis.  Therefore, “interrogated the suspect” will suffice for the 
long-winded “subjected the suspect to express questioning or the functional 
equivalent of interrogation.”  
95. But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 533 (White, J., dissenting) (“Although in the 
Court’s view in-custody interrogation is inherently coercive, the Court [illogically] 
says that the spontaneous product of the coercion of arrest and detention is still to be 
deemed voluntary.”). 
96. Id. at 545. 
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of their actions, accounting for suspects’ perceptions and known 
susceptibilities.97  Application of the new interrogation definition 
would undoubtedly be a painstaking and onerous task for lower 
courts, but it was a definition nonetheless.98 
C. Though the Supreme Court finally produced a working definition 
of interrogation in Innis, the Court’s application of this definition 
produced a perplexing result that compromised its clarity 
As with many important constitutional questions—particularly 
those in the realm of criminal procedure—no one expected a 
mechanistic, straightforward answer to the “interrogation” inquiry.99  
The outcome in Innis did not disappoint, leaving prosecutors and 
defense attorneys with a muddled result. 
In January 1975, Providence police were searching for a man they 
had good reason to believe committed a series of taxicab crimes 
involving a sawed-off shotgun.100  Shortly after midnight on January 
17, one of the taxicab drivers and robbery victims identified the 
assailant as Thomas Innis.101  Police arrested Innis within hours of the 
driver’s identification.102  Police Mirandized103 Innis at least twice, 
97. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02. 
98. See, e.g., infra Parts III-IV; see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 
711 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Miranda, for 
all its alleged brightness, is not without its difficulties. . . . And the supposedly 
‘bright’ lines that separate interrogation from spontaneous declaration . . . turned out 
to be rather dim and ill defined.” (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 291)); Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 544-45 (White, J., dissenting) (“Nor can it be claimed that judicial time and 
effort . . . will be conserved because of the ease of application of the new rule.  
Today’s decision leaves open such questions as . . . whether [the accused’s] 
statements were spontaneous or the product of interrogation, . . . all of which are 
certain to prove productive of uncertainty during investigation and litigation during 
prosecution.”). 
99. See, e.g., White, supra note 52, at 1251 (“But even if the Court embraces 
the interpretations of the Innis and Henry rules advocated in this Article, cases 
requiring further refinement of its definition of ‘interrogation’ are likely to arise in 
the not-so-distant future.”). 
100. Innis, 446 U.S. at 293-94.  One of these run-ins resulted in the death of a 
driver.  Id. at 293. 
101. Id. at 293.   
102. Id. at 293-94 (Patrolman Lovell spotted and arrested Innis at 
approximately 4:30 a.m.).   
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after which he invoked his right to an attorney.104  The captain 
directed officers to place Innis in a “caged wagon” and drive him to 
the police station without questioning, intimidating, or coercing him in 
any way.105 
Not long after their journey began, two of the officers struck up a 
casual conversation about their proximity to a handicapped school.106  
Because of the handicapped children frequenting and “‘running 
around [the] area,’” the two officers agreed that it was in everybody’s 
best interest to find the missing shotgun believed to belong to Innis 
because, if found by the children, it could result in the death of a little 
girl.107  Perhaps no more than a mile into their journey,108 Innis 
103. Mirandize: to give or advise a suspect of his “so-called Miranda rights.”  
See, e.g., id. at 294 (referring to the rights described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 444 (1966)); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (“Prior to any questioning, the person 
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make 
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an 
attorney, either retained or appointed.”). 
104. Innis, 446 U.S. at 294.  Police must scrupulously honor this right once it 
has been invoked by ceasing interrogation or providing an attorney, and without 
seeking a waiver in the meantime (what is known as “badgering”).  Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 444-45 (“If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the 
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no 
questioning.  Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he 
does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.”).  
105. Innis, 446 U.S. at 294.  The “caged wagon” was a “four-door police car 
with a wire screen mesh between the front and rear seats.”  Id.  Though it is unclear, 
it is probable that one of the officers sat alongside Innis in the back of the wagon.  
The testimony of two officers suggested that Officer Gleckman sat in the front seat 
with the driver, while the captain and another officer testified that he sat in the back.  
Id. at 315 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“Two officers sat in the front seat and one sat beside Innis in the back seat.”). 
106. Id. at 294.   
107. Id. at 295 (“‘He [Officer Gleckman] said it would be too bad if the 
little—I believe he said a girl—would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself.’” 
(quoting Patrolman Williams’ testimony, who was driving and did not participate in 
the conversation)); see also id. at 294-95 (“‘I was talking back and forth with 
Patrolman McKenna stating that I frequent this area while on patrol and [that 
because a school for handicapped children is located nearby,] there’s a lot of 
handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them might 
find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Patrolman Gleckman’s testimony)).   
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interrupted the conversation to take the officers to the shotgun, which 
was hidden “under some rocks by the side of the road.”109  Innis 
informed the captain, after being re-read his rights, that he “‘wanted to 
get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area in the 
school.’”110 
A jury subsequently convicted Innis of the kidnapping, robbery, 
and murder of the deceased taxicab driver.111  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court determined that the police officers interrogated Innis, 
and in doing so had failed to scrupulously honor the invocation of his 
right to an attorney.112  Applying its newly-crafted definition of 
“interrogation,”113 the Supreme Court disagreed.114  The Court found 
that the officers neither questioned Innis nor subjected him to the 
functional equivalent of interrogation.115 
The majority reasoned that because the officers’ “off hand 
remarks” amounted to “nothing more than a dialogue,” they should 
not have expected that their conversation would elicit an incriminating 
response.116  The officers’ conversation was not a “lengthy harangue” 
comprised of “particularly evocative” comments.117  Furthermore, 
there was nothing to suggest that Innis “was peculiarly susceptible to 
an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped 
children,” or that he was “unusually disoriented or upset at the time of 
his arrest.”118  Defying Miranda, the Court explained that the “subtle 
compulsion” did not equate to interrogation.119 
108. Id. at 295 (“At the time the respondent indicated that the officers should 




111. Id. at 295-96. 
112. Id. at 296. 
113. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
114. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302. 
115. Id.  
116. Id. at 302-03. 
117. Id. at 303. 
118. Id. at 302-03.  But see, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) 
(holding a violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel when detective gave 
“Christian Burial Speech” to defendant when he “knew that Williams was a former 
mental patient, and knew also that he was deeply religious”); Townsend v. Sain, 372 
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This outcome was irksome and puzzling even to contemporaries, 
who predicted the opposite outcome would be the “obvious” result.120  
After going on at length about “psychological ploys”121 and how 
“limit[ing] . . . Miranda to express questioning would ‘place a 
premium on the ingenuity of the police,’”122 the Court appeared to 
have done just that.  In his dissent, Justice Marshall was “substantially 
in agreement with the Court’s definition of ‘interrogation’” but 
“utterly at a loss” to understand how its application led “to the 
conclusion that there was no interrogation.”123  Though Innis may 
have had no particular sensitivity to the well-being of handicapped 
children, Justice Marshall wrote, “[o]ne can scarcely imagine a 
stronger appeal to the conscience of a suspect.”124  Furthermore, 
appealing to a suspect’s decency or honor is “a classic interrogation 
technique.”125  These facts culminated in a result that “verge[d] on the 
ludicrous.”126  Similarly, Justice Stevens found the holding 
represented “a plain departure from the principles set forth in 
Miranda.”127 
U.S. 293 (1963) (holding that confession was involuntary when officers knowingly 
exploited a suspect who police physicians had given a drug with truth-serum 
properties).   
119. Innis, 446 U.S. at. 303 (“The Rhode Island Supreme Court erred, in short, 
in equating ‘subtle compulsion’ with interrogation.”).  But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
474 (“[A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other 
than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.”). 
120. Innis, 446 U.S. at 312 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“‘Under the 
proposed objective standard, the result is obvious.  Since the conversation indicates 
a strong desire to know the location of the shotgun, any person with knowledge of 
the weapon’s location would be likely to believe that the officers wanted him to 
disclose its location.  Thus, a reasonable person in Innis’ position would believe that 
the officers were seeking to solicit precisely the type of response that was given.’” 
(quoting Welsh White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Suspect’s 
Assertion of His Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 68 (1979) (proposing 
the same test adopted in Innis and applying it to the facts of the case))). 
121. Id. at 299.   
122. Id. at 299 n.3 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 285 A.2d 172, 175 
(Pa. 1971)). 
123. Id. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
124. Id. at 306. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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III.  INTERROGATION SINCE INNIS: GENERATING MORE QUESTIONS 
THAN ANSWERS 
A. Following Innis, the “likely to elicit” and “custody plus” 
definitions of interrogation emerged to produce divergent results, 
which Justice White discussed in his dissent from denial of certiorari 
in Lewis v. Florida 
If interrogation as imagined in Innis had a rocky start, its 
jurisprudence was no smoother in the following years.128  Innis was 
hardly an “aberration,”129 but foreshadowed chaotic outcomes in cases 
where interrogation was the principal issue.  To further complicate 
matters, the result in Innis encouraged strained readings of the “above 
and beyond” language130 that may have merely rephrased the principle 
that “volunteered statements” or “spontaneous” utterances made in 
custody were admissible.131  The Miranda majority suggested that, 
given the inherent compulsion in custody, any police conduct 
legitimized by a plausible response from a suspect would qualify as 
interrogation.132  Instead, some courts have dwelled on the “above and 
beyond” language, causing two different post-Innis interrogation 
regimes to emerge: one adhering to the “likely to elicit” 
definition133—the espoused rule of Innis—and another following a 
128. See Lewis v. Florida, 486 U.S. 1036, 1036 (1988) (White, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari); infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.   
129. Innis, 446 U.S. at 307 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
130. Id. at 300 (“‘Interrogation,’ as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, 
must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody 
itself.”).  See also supra note 26. 
131. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299-300 (“‘Any statement given freely and voluntarily 
without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. . . . 
Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment.’” 
(emphasis added) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478)).  The proximity of this 
passage from Miranda to the “above and beyond” language, see supra text 
accompanying note 26, hints that the “above and beyond” language simply reiterated 
the concept that completely volunteered statements are not barred.  The dictum has 
not been interpreted so by many lower courts, though.  See infra Parts III.B-IV. 
132. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458; id. at 532 (White, J., dissenting).  
133. The “likely to elicit” definition of interrogation is literally the rule 
established in Innis: “‘[I]nterrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express 
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than 
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are 
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“custody plus” definition that derives an additional element of 
compulsion from the “above and beyond” dictum in Innis.134 
In 1988, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to a Florida case, 
passing on an opportunity to resolve the main discrepancy among 
lower courts over what constitutes “interrogation” under Miranda.  In 
Lewis v. State,135 Robert Lee Lewis invoked his right to remain silent 
after receiving his Miranda warnings in connection with his arrest for 
armed robbery.136  Despite the rules from Miranda and Innis, police 
presented Lewis with a private screening of a video of the robbery.137  
As the video played, Lewis provided his own artistic criticism with 
comments such as, “‘Man, he took it like a man.  I should have hit him 
a couple more times.’”138  After the trial court denied his motion to 
suppress the statements and the Florida Fourth District Court of 
Appeal affirmed his conviction, Lewis unsuccessfully petitioned the 
Supreme Court for certiorari.139 
Justice White dissented from the denial of certiorari, observing the 
“significant disagreement . . . among the state and federal courts” on 
the proper construction of Innis.140  Depending on which of the two 
interpretations is proper, the wildly inconsistent results necessarily 
handicapped “legitimate law enforcement practices” in some 
jurisdictions and approved of inappropriate psychological ploys in 
others.141  Petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, Lewis argued 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 
U.S. at 301 (footnotes omitted).   
134. The “custody plus” definition is substantially the same as the “likely to 
elicit” definition, but also requires an additional “measure of compulsion above and 
beyond that inherent in custody itself” where that measure of compulsion is not 
identical to “words or actions on the part of police . . . reasonably like to elicit an 
incriminating response.”  Id. at 300-01.   
135. Lewis v. State, 509 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
136. Id. 
137. Id.  
138. Id.  
139. Lewis v. Florida, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988) (denying petition for certiorari). 
140. Id. (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).   
141. Id. at 1036.  See also, e.g., United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 371 (10th 
Cir. 1985) (holding that suspect’s statement “‘That’s cocaine, too!’” was admissible 
as officer examined contents of suspect’s pockets, as was statement, “‘[n]o if [you] 
look in there, I’ll be in real trouble,’” when asked for permission to search trunk); 
United States v. Bennett, 626 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that officer’s 
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that confronting a suspect with evidence is the functional equivalent of 
interrogation.142  “[I]n light of Innis,” Justice White considered 
“[w]hether police may confront a suspect with evidence against 
him . . . without engaging in the ‘functional equivalent’ of 
interrogation [to be] a substantial question.”143  Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari and the Florida court’s decision 
remained undisturbed. 
B. Discussed in Justice White’s opinion in Lewis v. Florida, Lewis v. 
State and People v. Ferro are microcosms of the warring 
interpretations of Innis 
While pointing to a multitude of cases to demonstrate the 
“significant disagreement” over the interpretation of Innis,144  Justice 
White’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Lewis v. Florida 
discussed the details of only two such cases: Lewis v. State and People 
v. Ferro.145  The contrary results in these cases, and the contrasting 
reasoning by their courts, illuminate the “likely to elicit” and “custody 
plus” interpretations of Innis and how they conflict with one another. 
In Lewis,146 the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida voiced 
support for the “custody plus” interpretation of Innis,147 finding that 
statement at scene of arrest that “‘[t]here is a gun in the car’” and seizing the gun to 
check and see if it was loaded did not constitute an interrogation within meaning of 
Miranda); State v. Benjamin, 300 N.W.2d 661, 667 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding 
that shoplifting suspect’s statements in response to being shown knives obtained 
from her purse merely the “unforeseeable result of a brief, unembellished gesture” 
by the deputy); State v. Gibson, 422 N.W.2d 570, 577 (Neb. 1988) (conceding it 
may be on the “on the cutting edge of immeasurable imprudence,” yet finding no 
interrogation where officer said, “‘Oh, look what I found’” after discovering loaded 
revolver in the defendant’s presence). 
142. Lewis v. State, 509 So. 2d 1236, 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).   
143. Lewis, 486 U.S. at 1036 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
144. See infra note 153. 
145. Id. (referring to Lewis, 509 So. 2d at 1236, and Ferro, 472 N.E. 2d at 14).   
146. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text. 
147. Again, the “likely to elicit” definition of interrogation is the rule the 
Supreme Court fashioned in Innis, while the “custody plus” definition is the 
unofficial tendency of courts to look for an additional “measure of compulsion 
above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.”  See supra notes 133-34.  Any 
“support” for one interpretation or the other is implicit from the language and 
interpretive clues discussed in this Part.   
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the “police procedure did not impinge upon [Lewis’] will in a coercive 
manner.”148  The court conceded that perhaps “the police should have 
known that showing [Lewis] the evidence against him would be likely 
to elicit an incriminating response,” which would be an interrogation 
under the “likely to elicit” rule from Innis.149  Instead, the court found 
it was “unlikely that the appellant was compelled to incriminate 
himself by viewing a video of the robbery.”150  To defend its position, 
the court referenced Lewis’ familiarity with the justice system and 
appearance of levity during the video as evidence belying any 
contention that the “interrogation environment” coerced him into 
speaking.151  Though unsuccessful, Lewis had a strong premise: 
parading evidence in front of a suspect ought to be considered 
interrogation, as other jurisdictions had concluded.152 
In contrast, the majority of the New York Court of Appeals 
demonstrated its loyalty to the “likely to elicit” definition of 
interrogation in People v. Ferro.153  Police arrested Ferro and took 
him to the precinct station while investigating a murder that occurred 
during a residential robbery.154  After receiving his Miranda warnings, 
Ferro elected not to answer any questions and asked a precinct 
detective if he could speak with a district attorney.155  The detective 
declined the request and left Ferro in his cell, returning with a pile of 
stolen furs that had belonged to the now-deceased robbery victim.156  
The detective strategically plopped the furs “right in front of the cell a 
foot away from [Ferro].  Ferro then grabbed ahold of the wire mesh 
148. Lewis v. State, 509 So. 2d at 1237. 
149. Id. at 1237. 
150. Id. (emphasis added). 
151. Id.  
152. See Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096 (Del. 1986) (verbal recitation of 
evidence); State v. Quinn, 498 A.2d 676, 679 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (informing 
suspect in print that co-defendants had implicated him effectively told suspect, 
“‘Look and see for yourself what I have against you.  Now what do you have to 
say’?”); Koza v. State, 718 P.2d 671 (Nev. 1986) (informing defendant of charges 
and evidence against her); see also infra Part IV. 
153. People v. Ferro, 472 N.E.2d 13, 14 (N.Y. 1984). 
154. Id.  
155. Id. at 14. 
156. Id. at 15.  
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with both hands and said ‘Hey, I got to talk to you.’”157  Over the 
course of the ensuing conversation, “which began as soon as the furs 
were placed on the floor in front of the cell,” Ferro asked to speak 
with an Italian detective, to whom he made several statements which 
the prosecution used against Ferro.158 
The New York Court of Appeals recited that, under Innis, “the 
test is not whether the detectives in fact intended to interrogate 
defendant but whether an objective observer would conclude that the 
conduct of the detectives was reasonably likely to elicit a response 
from defendant.”159  The majority discerned no difficulty in 
concluding that the detective and his companion interrogated Ferro. 
The court found “no other inference that could be drawn from the 
undisputed facts than that the police should have known that 
defendant was reasonably likely to respond to the placing of the furs 
before him by making a statement.”160  Because the majority applied 
the Innis definition of interrogation in its most literal, straightforward 
sense, there was “no other conclusion . . . possible.”161  The majority 
even stressed, “the only possible object of the police action in 
revealing evidence to a defendant is to elicit a statement from him,”162 
a result directly contradicting Lewis.163 
157. Id. at 15 (alteration in original) (quoting Detective Hudson’s recollection 
of Ferro’s comment) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See id. (“Hudson testified 
that there was one continuous conversation.”). 
158. Id. (“Ferro recounted [to Detective Cassi] that he had been told by a 
woman who was decedent’s next-door neighbor that decedent was giving her a great 
deal of trouble for which she wanted decedent robbed as a means of revenge, that he 
had told the neighbor he was not interested, and in response to her question whether 
he could get somebody to do so, had responded only that he would think about it.”).  
159. Id. at 15-17 (discussing Innis).   
160. Id. at 16. 
161. Id. at 17. 
162. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).  This statement suggests that the New York 
Court of Appeals categorically considered revealing evidence to a suspect to be the 
functional equivalent of interrogation.   
163. On the other hand, the dissent in Ferro opposed the majority’s plain 
understanding of Innis, subscribing instead to the “custody plus” interpretation of 
interrogation.  Id. at 17.  The dissent accused the majority of “interpret[ing] the 
‘likely to elicit’ test too literally and mechanically.”  Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted).  The dissent found the placement of the furs to be “noncoercive 
police conduct” as Ferro simply “change[d] his mind,” apparently on a whim, when 
he decided to speak with police.  Id. at 21.  The dissenting opinion contained a 
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With Lewis and Ferro providing the backdrop, one can see why 
Justice White thought it necessary to reconsider Innis and resolve the 
significant disagreement over interrogation.  Both cases dealt with 
situations in which police exposed damning evidence to criminal 
suspects.  The opposite outcomes, based on strikingly similar facts, 
demonstrate the two opposing interpretations of Innis that have 
blossomed and clashed unabated since 1980. 
IV.  THE “LIKELY TO ELICIT” AND “CUSTODY PLUS” INTERPRETATIONS 
OF INNIS: PRODUCING VASTLY DIFFERENT RESULTS 
The Supreme Court has considered a handful of cases implicating 
the Innis definition of interrogation without resolving the discord 
recognized by Justice White in Lewis.164  In 1987, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the illegality of using confessions obtained by 
psychological ploys in Arizona v. Mauro.165  The Supreme Court dealt 
with another psychological ploy in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, although 
the propriety of the officer’s trick question dodged Innis scrutiny 
variation of the word coercion or compulsion fourteen times, compared with the 
majority’s use of such words only twice.  See id. at 14-21.  Although this term 
counting is an unscientific method, repetition of such words (coercion, uncoerced, 
uncoercive, compelled, compulsory, compulsion) is symptomatic of an opinion 
obeying the “custody plus” definition of interrogation. 
164. See supra Part III.A. 
165. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987).  In Mauro, police arrested a man 
that walked into a Kmart store professing that he had killed his son.  Id. at 521-22.  
After being advised of his Miranda rights a second time, Mauro invoked his right to 
have an attorney.  Id. at 522.  While Mauro remained in the police captain’s office, a 
detective questioned Mauro’s wife, who insisted on speaking with her husband.  Id.  
The detective relented and allowed Mauro and his wife to chat while the detective 
ensconced himself and a tape recorder at a nearby desk.  Id.  The 5-4 majority had 
no difficulty concluding that the detective did not interrogate Mauro under Miranda 
and Innis.  Mauro, 481 U.S. at 527.  While reaffirming that “psychological ploy[s]” 
may be the functional equivalent of interrogation, id., the Court ruled that the police 
had not “us[ed] the coercive nature of confinement to extract [the] confessions.”  Id. 
at 530 (emphasis added).  Mauro is very instructive in circumstances where family 
members or significant others meet with a suspect, but did little to clarify Innis 
beyond such narrow circumstances.  Justice White remained dissatisfied with any 
steps Mauro took to resolve the major questions remaining after Innis, as Mauro was 
decided in the year before Justice White’s dissent in Lewis v. Florida.  See Lewis v. 
Florida, 486 U.S. 1036 (White, J., dissenting from denial to certiorari). 
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because it was an express question.166  Since Mauro and Muniz, the 
Supreme Court has cited Innis only in passing,167 sidestepping a 
protracted discussion of the case that still provides the only recognized 
definition of “interrogation.”  Unaided by the result in Innis and the 
Court’s shirking of cases such as Lewis, the significant disagreement 
over the proper interpretation of Innis persists as lower courts settle 
for one theory or the other to determine the legality of law 
enforcement’s more mischievous methods of obtaining incriminating 
statements.168 
In opinions similar to Ferro, the drama of the different 
interrogation camps occasionally unfolds through divided courts.169  
Argumentative opinions by divided courts provide a stage for the 
dispute between the “likely to elicit” and “custody plus” 
interpretations, splaying their inherent tension and friction in the 
spotlight.  In 2002, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an 
officer’s production of physical evidence before a suspect constituted 
the functional equivalent of interrogation.170  In Drury, police brought 
166. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).  In Muniz, a Pennsylvania 
officer arrested a man for drunken-driving in the wee morning hours of November 
30, 1986, following a roadside urination incident.  Id. at 584-86.  During booking, 
the “officer . . . asked Muniz, ‘Do you know what the date was of your sixth 
birthday?’” which stumped the slurring, uncoordinated Muniz.  Id. at 586.  The 
Court nonchalantly concluded that the sixth birthday question was custodial 
interrogation once it determined that the express question “required a testimonial 
response.”  Id. at 600.  This is unfortunate, because the sixth birthday question is 
precisely the type of psychological ploy worthy of an Innis analysis that could 
benefit lower courts struggling with “more adventurous” police practices.  Lewis, 
486 U.S. at 1036 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).   
167. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1156 n.7 (2011); Florida v. 
Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 60 (2010); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839 n.4 (2006) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004); 
Illinois v. Perkins, 462 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) (“The essential ingredients of a ‘police-
dominated atmosphere’ and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person 
speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow inmate.”).   
168. See Part IV. 
169. See, e.g., United States v. Thierman, 678 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1982); State 
v. Tucker, 692 N.E.2d 171 (Ohio 1998); Thai Ngoc Nguyen v. State, 292 S.W.3d 
671, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“This is not the sort of 
interrogation contemplated by Miranda.”). 
170. Drury v. State, 793 A.2d 567, 571 (Md. 2002). 
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the suspect to the station “for questioning,”171 when the officer placed 
a tire iron and a garbage bag of magazines on the desk in front of the 
suspect.172  Applying the “likely to elicit” definition of 
interrogation,173 the majority reasoned that “[t]he only plausible 
explanation for the officer’s conduct is that he expected to elicit a 
statement from [the suspect].”174 
The dissent in Drury took issue with the majority’s reasoning, 
relying instead on the “custody plus” definition of interrogation.  The 
dissent argued that the officer’s conduct did not “rise to the level of 
coercion or compulsion contemplated in Innis as being the functional 
equivalent of an interrogation.”175  Though conceding that the officer 
may have been acting “deceptive,”176 the dissent found the suspect 
had merely “blurted out an explanation” independent of any police 
conduct.177  Fittingly, the majority opinion cited Ferro and the dissent 
cited State v. Lewis as supporting authority for interrogation as each 
perceived it. 
Post-Lewis, the most significant unanswered question remains 
whether confronting suspects with evidence of a crime is 
interrogation.  Because of this lingering question, police in some 
jurisdictions have the freedom to engage in quirkier, more provocative 
behavior, while others are prohibited from eliciting confessions 
through suggestive behavior that may be lawful under Innis.178 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin came to a different conclusion 
than the Ferro court when applying the “likely to elicit” test.179  In 
171. Id. at 569; see also id. at 571 (“[T]he officer . . . told petitioner that he 
was being brought in for questioning.”). 
172. Id. at 569. 
173. See id. at 570. 
174. Id. at 571. 
175. Id. at 577 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). 
176. Id. at 578. 
177. Id. at 575-78. 
178. See Lewis v. Florida, 486 U.S. 1036, 1037 (1988) (White, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari).   
179.   
[T]he Innis test reflects both an objective foreseeability standard and the 
police officer’s specific knowledge of the suspect.  The Innis test can be 
stated as follows: if an objective observer (with the same knowledge of the 
suspect as the police officer) could, on the sole basis of hearing the 
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Cunningham, the court held that although confronting a defendant 
with physical evidence may be the functional equivalent of 
interrogation, confronting the arrestee with a revolver obtained from 
his bedroom was not.180  Following an altercation between the police 
and the defendant during the execution of a warrant, an officer found a 
loaded revolver under the mattress in the defendant’s bedroom.181  
One officer presented the revolver to the defendant and quipped, 
“‘This was apparently what Mr. Cunningham was running into the 
bedroom for,’” at which point the defendant provided a justification 
for owning the weapon.182  Upholding the admissibility of the 
defendant’s statement, the court found that the police had not “‘us[ed] 
the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would 
not be given in an unrestrained environment.’”183 
Although the courts in Cunningham and Ferro used the “likely to 
elicit” definition to reach different conclusions, the cases are 
distinguishable.  In Cunningham, the defendant was in custody for 
resisting officers after a struggle in which the defendant apparently 
attempted to destroy evidence or obtain his firearm.184  The defendant 
officer’s remarks or observing the officer’s conduct, conclude that the 
officer’s conduct or words would be likely to elicit an incriminating 
response, that is, could reasonably have had the force of a question on the 
suspect, then the conduct or words would constitute interrogation.  
State v. Cunningham, 423 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Wis. 1988) (emphasis added).  This 
recitation of the Innis test is one of the most succinct and instructive articulations of 
the “likely to elicit” test in existing case law interpreting interrogation.  Cunningham 
is still the law in Wisconsin.  See State v. Hambly, 745 N.W.2d 48, 61-62 (Wis. 
2008). 
180. Cunningham, 423 N.W. 2d at 866 (“While we acknowledge that the 
presentation of evidence may in some cases be the functional equivalent of express 
questioning, the facts of this case do not compel such a determination.”). 
181. Id. at 863. 
182. Id. (“[T]he defendant stated something to the effect that it was his 
bedroom and that he had a right to have a gun.”). 
183. Id. at 865-66 (emphasis added) (quoting Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 
530 (1987)). 
184. Id. at 863 (“When the officers entered the apartment, the defendant ran 
into the bedroom in an attempt to grab or discard items near the head of the bed.  In 
the course of a struggle with the officers, the defendant scattered cocaine around the 
room.  The officers subdued the defendant, handcuffed him, and placed him under 
arrest for resisting an officer.  The officers did not read him any Miranda 
warnings.”). 
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was still in his home when the officers arrested him and continued 
their lawful search of the home.185  Additionally, the officer’s conduct 
and words in Cunningham “were not as provocative as the officer’s 
comments in Innis.”186  In Ferro, on the other hand, the defendant was 
in a cell when police obtained the fur coats from the co-defendant’s 
apartment as part of an ongoing investigation.187  Therefore, 
presenting the coats to the defendant served no logical purpose other 
than to excite the defendant and stir his anxieties.188 
In short, Cunningham did not deal with the same brand of 
deceitful police behaviors rebuked in Miranda.  Decided just days 
after Justice White’s Lewis opinion, Cunningham provides a sensible 
interpretation of Innis that could help resolve the confusion over 
interrogation.189 
Most jurisdictions have declined to adopt categorical rules that 
allow or forbid confronting a suspect with physical evidence.190  
Instead, these cases have been decided on the facts specific to each 
situation.191  Sometimes, interactions with the suspect occur outside 
the typical “interrogation environment” where the suspect is 
nonetheless in custody, such as at the scene of arrest.192  In these 
185. Id. at 863. 
186. Id. at 866.  
187. People v. Ferro, 472 N.E.2d 13, 14 (N.Y. 1984). 
188. Id. at 17. 
189. Justice White’s Lewis dissent was issued on May 31, 1988, and the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Cunningham on June 2, 1988. 
190. See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 422 N.W.2d 570, 577 (Neb. 1988) (“Mere 
display of the discovered revolver cannot be categorically characterized as [a] 
practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating 
response from a suspect.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
State v. Cunningham, 423 N.W.2d 862, 866 (Wis. 1988).  But see Ferro, 472 NE.2d 
at 17.   
191. See, e.g., Cunningham, 423 N.W.2d at 862-63 (“Applying the Innis test, 
we conclude that a police officer’s confronting the accused with physical evidence 
of a crime may be, but is not necessarily, the functional equivalent of express 
questioning.  Each case must be considered upon its own facts.”). 
192. See, e.g., United States v. Genao, 281 F.3d 305, 311 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(excusing officer’s statement that “‘We’ve got a problem here.’” while showing 
arrestee heroin and handguns “as a preliminary comment intended to get Genao’s 
attention before reading him his rights and explaining that he was under arrest” and 
because “the remark was brief, was not worded in a particularly confrontational 
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cases, police conduct is often a defensible part of ongoing Fourth 
Amendment activity such as an apparently lawful search or seizure.193  
The cases with such ongoing investigative activities frequently lack 
the orchestrated, oppressive atmosphere associated with 
incommunicado interrogation.194 
manner, and did not directly accuse Genao of any crime or seek to inflame his 
conscience”); Smith v. State, 995 A.2d 685, 690 (Md. 2010) (holding that officer’s 
brandishing of crack cocaine at defendant was not interrogation because defendant 
“was not removed from his home for the express purpose of questioning . . . . was 
not subject to police confrontation, implicit questioning, or a purposeful technique 
calculated to obtain incriminating evidence” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
But see Commonwealth v. Rubio, 540 N.E.2d 189, 193-94 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) 
(showing cocaine in pocketbook to suspect sitting in his kitchen chair surrounded by 
officers was “clearly confrontational and had the force of an implicit question: ‘Is 
this yours?’”). 
193. United States v. Broughton, No. 13–CR–164, 2013 WL 5744473, at *7 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2013) (“The defendant relies on [Ferro]. . . . [T]his case is 
readily distinguishable.  Officer Aronica merely continued a process of examining 
Broughton’s bag for contraband.  This ongoing search is not the type of activity that 
was likely to elicit an incriminating response.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).   
194. Statements obtained during ongoing Fourth Amendment activity or 
outside the interrogation environment are typically better decided on “custody” 
grounds as opposed to “interrogation” grounds.  But circumstances may create 
custody via a de facto arrest.  So, Fourth Amendment activity should be a relevant 
factor in an interrogation analysis to prevent Miranda excluding statements where 
the custody in-fact was merely incidental to the search or seizure.  See California v. 
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (“Although the circumstances of each case 
must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ for 
purposes of receiving of Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply whether 
there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree 
associated with a formal arrest.” (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 
(1977))); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (“Thus, for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband founded on 
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants 
of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” (footnote omitted)).  Oddly 
enough, police cannot argue that a suspect has not been “formally arrested” once 
they have read the suspect his or her Miranda warnings.  Reading a suspect his or 
her rights is basically a way of saying “you’re under arrest, you may now invoke 
your rights if you wish.”  This peculiarity—that an overly cautious officer 
unnecessarily warning a suspect of his rights makes the suspect “in custody” for 
Miranda purposes—strengthens the case for those advocating the “interplay” theory 
of “custodial interrogation.”  See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
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Although the two situations are undeniably different, courts have 
handled cases where the police verbally recount evidence against 
suspects—truthfully or dishonestly—in a similar fashion as those 
where police parade physical evidence in front of suspects.195  Lower 
courts have also dealt with instances in which suspects respond to 
actual or threatened charges against them.196  Comparably, other 
195. See, e.g., United States v. McKenzie, 132 F. App’x. 788 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(telling suspect that the police found marijuana and cocaine in his room during arrest 
not interrogation); United States v. Brown, 737 A.2d 1016 (D.C. 1999) (telling 
suspect the reason for his arrest not interrogation, and Brown’s argument 
“exaggerate[d] the coercive effect of . . . events”); Shedelblower v. Estelle, 885 F.2d 
570, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1989) (informing suspect that his accomplice had been 
arrested and that the victim had identified the suspect, even though that latter 
statement was untrue, not interrogation); People v. Haley, 96 P.3d 170, 182 (Cal. 
2004) (telling suspect that detective “knew” he committed the murder due to the 
discovery of his fingerprints not interrogation); State v. Hambly, 745 N.W.2d 48, 64 
(Wis. 2008) (holding no interrogation where officer informed arrestee that he had 
sold cocaine to an informant in response to arrestee’s statement that he did not 
understand why he was under arrest).  But see Nelson v. Fulcomer, 911 F.2d 928, 
935 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[C]onfronting a suspect with his alleged partner in crime and 
the fact that the partner has confessed is precisely the kind of psychological ploy that 
Innis’ definition of interrogation was designed to prohibit.”); Hill v. United States, 
858 A.2d 435, 447 (D.C. 2004) (telling suspect that he was being charged with 
second degree murder and that his friend “told police what happened . . . resembles 
the kind of mental games that largely generated the Miranda decision itself” 
(quoting Brown, 737 A.2d at 1021)); United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1033 
(9th Cir. 2001) (engaging suspect in “several minutes of detailed discussion 
regarding the evidence against her” and “even [going] so far as to make up some of 
the evidence” was interrogation); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 787 A.2d 394, 401 
(Pa. 2001) (telling defendant that he had been implicated in two shootings 
statements from two witnesses was interrogation). 
196. See, e.g., McGlothen v. State, 556 F.3d 698, 702 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he 
officer’s words indicating that McGlothen was to be charged with possession of a 
firearm were statements of fact, not the functional equivalent of an interrogation.”), 
cert. denied, 557 U.S. 913 (2009); State v. Conover, 537 A.2d 1165, 1171-72 (Md. 
1988) (reading and giving suspect charging form in compliance with Maryland 
rules, where court could “infer no sinister motive”); see also Patterson v. Illinois, 
487 U.S. 285, 288 (1988) (mentioning that officer “told [defendant] that because he 
had been indicted he was being transferred to the Cook County jail,” but not 
discussing Innis despite defendant’s incriminating responses prompted by this 
information).  But see Blake v. State, 849 A.2d 410, 420 (Md. 2004) (“[O]fficer’s 
statement [“I bet you want to talk now, huh!”] . . . could only be interpreted as 
designed to induce petitioner to talk and it was improper” when accompanying 
charging document with false statement of law with respect to the death penalty.). 
                                                          
35
Welch: Asking the Scary Question: What Is the Correct Understanding of "
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013
WelchApprovedFinal Draft.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/2/2014  11:51 AM 
268 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
courts have analyzed whether hinting at the benefits of cooperating 
with police in conjunction with potential charges qualify as 
interrogation.197 
Foreshadowed by the result in Innis, courts struggle to 
consistently classify statements instigated by evocative comments as 
“volunteered” or “the product of interrogation.”198  It is also common 
for courts seeking an additional measure of compulsion to characterize 
persuasive police conduct as in the suspect’s best interest.  Instances 
197. See, e.g., Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2006) (informing 
suspect of evidence and the possible consequences of charges did not constitute 
interrogation); People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099, 1118 (Cal. 1993) (responding to 
suspect’s comment “‘[w]hat can someone get for something like this, thirty years?’” 
by telling him that he had never seen anyone serve more than seven and a half years 
unless the person was a “‘mass murderer’”).  But see United States v. Gomez, 927 
F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that agents’ comments about the possible 
benefits of cooperating with the government were interrogation when accompanying 
document with incorrect information about charges); People v. Jackson, 959 
N.Y.S.2d 540, 543 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (“When the arresting officer told the 
defendant that, unless someone confessed to ownership of the gun, all three 
occupants of the car would be charged with its possession, he was engaging in the 
functional equivalent of interrogation . . . .”). 
198. See, e.g., United States v. Kane, 726 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(asking suspect how he was doing and telling him “‘only you can help yourself’” 
was not interrogation); State v. Lebron, 979 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) 
(asking defendant if he knew “‘how much trouble [he was] in’” constituted 
interrogation); Prioleau v. State, 984 A.2d 851, 853 (Md. 2009) (holding that officer 
should not have known saying “‘What’s up, Maurice?’” would produce an 
incriminating response); Williams v. State, 679 A.2d 1106, 1125 (Md. 1996) (saying 
“‘[t]his is going to work’” and reiterating to suspect his potential double murder 
charge were innocuous comments that “simply advised [suspect] that police had 
evidence they believed established [his] guilt in a double homicide”); Murray v. 
State, 864 S.W.2d 111 (Tex.  App. 1993) (saying “‘Happy Birthday’” to a suspect in 
an interrogation room did not constitute interrogation).  But see Blake v. State, 849 
A.2d 410, 420 (Md. 2004) (“[O]fficer’s statement [“I bet you want to talk now, 
huh!”] . . . could only be interpreted as designed to induce petitioner to talk and it 
was improper” when accompanying charging document with false statement of law 
with respect to the death penalty.); Thai Ngoc Nguyen v. State, No. 05–07–00030–
CR, 2008 WL 726218, at *5 (Tex. App. Mar. 19, 2008) (holding that officer’s 
comment “‘If you want to tell me that that’s your meth, then tell me that’s your 
stuff’” was interrogation), aff’d, 292 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); 
Commonwealth v. Quarles, 720 S.E.2d 84, 86-89 (Va. 2012) (holding that officer’s 
comment “‘that’s fine if he doesn’t want to talk to me.  I was not the person that 
robbed a white lady and hit her in the head with a brick,’” was only compulsion “of 
the subtle variety approved . . . under Innis”). 
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of “casual conversation” have produced results similar to Innis,199 
while other officers have lawfully suggested to suspects that it is in 
their best interest to cooperate with police investigations.200 
A court applying the black letter definition of the “functional 
equivalent of interrogation” would “inevitably” forbid the preceding 
practices in most circumstances.201  The recurring post-Lewis cases 
where police confront a suspect with physical evidence have produced 
inconsistent results, though courts find that no interrogation occurred 
more often than not.  Courts employing the “likely to elicit” definition 
from Innis have decided the “brandishing evidence” issue either way, 
199. See, e.g., Minor v. Davis, No. 08–cv–13122, 2013 WL 2371766, at *9 
(E.D. Mich. May 30, 2013) (accusing suspect of lying about where he was shot was 
merely part of “casual conversation to pass the time”); People v. Gamache, 227 P.3d 
342, 387-88 (Cal. 2010) (holding that “small talk is permitted” under Miranda and 
Innis).  But see, e.g., State v. Flack, 860 P.2d 89, 92-93 (Mont. 1993) (holding that 
five to ten minute speech about how suspect “‘couldn’t get out of it’” and “‘might as 
well just go ahead and hang it up,’” “[u]nlike the officer’s statement in Innis, . . . 
cannot be characterized as a few overheard, offhand remarks”); State v. Tucker, 692 
N.E.2d 171, 174-76 (Ohio 1998) (taking defendant whose trial was pending to a side 
room of prison to hold impromptu therapy session not interrogation but “casual 
conversation” where guards were “simply looking out for Tucker’s well-being”). 
200. See, e.g., State v. Grant, 944 A.2d 947, 967 (Conn. 2008) (“Rovella’s 
comment to the defendant that his blood had been found at the scene of the crime 
did not constitute an interrogation under Innis. . . . [H]e was merely . . . providing 
information to the defendant that was necessary for ‘an intelligent exercise of his 
judgment’ . . . .” (quoting United States v. Crisco, 725 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 
1984))); State v. Guysinger, No. 11CA3251, 2012 WL 4021058, at *5 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Sept. 7, 2012) (saying to suspect that it was “‘likely in his best interest to start 
thinking about the situation and how things were going, and basically, just be honest 
about the situation’” (alterations omitted)).  But see, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 
927 F.2d 1530, 1538 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing to suspect “the benefits of 
cooperation . . . . is precisely the type of psychological ploy Innis and Miranda 
sought to prevent”); State v. Sargent, 762 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Wash. 1988) (stating 
something “to the effect that Sargent should ‘come to the truth’ with himself and 
that Sargent could not benefit from mental health counseling unless he did so . . . . is 
just the sort of psychological coercion inherent in custodial situations which 
Miranda recognizes as the basis of its custodial interrogation standard”); State v. 
Martin, 816 N.W.2d 270, 284 (Wis. 2012) (telling suspect that police “did not want 
Martin to say it was his revolver if it was not, but he should be a ‘stand-up guy’ and 
admit the revolver was his if it was”).   
201. White, supra note 52, at 1234.   
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as seen in Ferro and Cunningham.202  On the other hand, decisions by 
courts implementing the “custody plus” definition of interrogation, as 
in State v. Lewis, are irreconcilable with the “likely to elicit” 
understanding of Innis.203  Though the outcomes are not necessarily 
different, if a court requires an additional measure of mystery 
compulsion beyond custody itself, the outcome is scripted to end in 
“no interrogation.”204 
202. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 541 F.3d 176, 187 (3d Cir.) (“[W]e can 
hardly imagine a more prototypical example of the ‘functional equivalent’ of 
interrogation than when a suspect is shown a video in which he is depicted as 
engaging in a criminal act”), vacated, 340 F. App’x. 981 (3rd Cir. 2008); Young v. 
Sirmons, No. 00-CV-00310-JHP-PJC, 2007 WL 2248158, at *29 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 
2, 2007) (conversing during inspection of suspect’s shoes not “the kind of 
psychological ploy that could be treated as the functional equivalent of 
interrogation” when suspect told officers that it was fish blood that covered his 
shoes); Gonzalez v. State, 626 S.E.2d 569 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (picking up 
defendant’s shoes while saying “‘Does that look like blood to you?’” to fellow 
officer was not interrogation of Spanish-speaking defendant); State v. Nixon, 599 
A.2d 66, 67 (Me. 1991) (peering at diagram of crime scene and pushing it toward 
suspect, saying, “‘You might find this interesting.’” was “reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response”).  But see State v. Gibson, 422 N.W.2d 570, 577 (Neb. 
1988); State v. Cunningham, 423 N.W.2d 862 (Wis. 1988). 
203. Compare supra discussion accompanying notes 147-53, with supra 
discussion accompanying notes 154-64. 
204. See, e.g., United States v. Broughton, No. 13–CR–164, 2013 WL 
5744473, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2013) (searching bags for cocaine in presence of 
suspect in custody did not “produce psychological pressures that . . . subject the 
individual to the ‘will’ of [her] examiner” (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 356 
F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2004))); Kennedy v. State, 540 S.E.2d 229, 230-31 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2000) (officer’s picking up and inspection of two slabs of crack cocaine after 
suspect invoked his right to remain silent at police station did not amount to “the 
type of tricks or psychological ploys” feared by the Supreme Court); State v. Moody 
974 N.E.2d 1273 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (sharing result of field test for crack cocaine 
with other officer not interrogation); State v. Bragg, 48 A.3d 769, 773 (Me. 2012) 
(informing suspect that her blood-alcohol level was over the state limit was “a 
matter-of-fact communication” of the evidence); State v. Marrero, No. 
10CA009867, 2011 WL 3273582, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2011) (remarking 
about the amount of cocaine in suspect’s duffel bag while executing search warrant 
not interrogation as suspect was “not compelled to speak” by comment); State v. 
Smiley, No. 23815, 2008 WL 1808380, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2008) 
(remarking that cocaine looked to weigh “about an ounce” was not interrogation 
when defendant corrected officer in response).   
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V.  ASKING THE SCARY QUESTION: REVISITING INNIS TO SETTLE THE 
DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE “LIKELY TO ELICIT” AND “CUSTODY 
PLUS” INTERROGATION CAMPS 
A. The Supreme Court should revisit “interrogation” as defined by 
Innis to resolve the significant disagreement in lower courts, though it 
could have severe consequences for Miranda’s place in American law 
The cases discussed in the preceding sections show that the 
questions raised by “interrogation” between Innis and Lewis remain 
unanswered.  Given the persisting disagreement over the limits of 
“more adventurous police practices,”205 why would the Supreme 
Court not revisit Innis to clarify what is fair and foul to secure the 
“most compelling possible evidence of guilt”?206 
The reluctance to tackle interrogation head-on again may be due 
to the potential consequences for the Miranda doctrine as a whole.  
The Court’s recent decisions on implied waiver and due process 
indicate a gradual distancing from the principles of Miranda.207  
205. Lewis v. Florida, 486 U.S. 1036, 1036 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari).   
206. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 685 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
207. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (“Where the 
prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by 
the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the 
right to remain silent.”); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000) 
(“If anything, our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on 
legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling that 
unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution’s case in 
chief.”); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 712, (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“By dispensing with . . . [Miranda’s] difficulty of 
producing a yes-or-no answer to questions that are often better answered in shades 
and degrees, the voluntariness inquiry often can make judicial decisionmaking easier 
rather than more onerous.”); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (“[T]here is 
no warrant for presuming coercive effect where the suspect’s initial inculpatory 
statement, though technically in violation of Miranda, was voluntary.  The relevant 
inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.”).  But 
see, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004) (“Strategists dedicated to 
draining the substance out of Miranda cannot accomplish [this] by training 
instructions.”); id. at 617 n.8 (“Because we find that the warnings were inadequate, 
there is no need to assess the actual voluntariness of the statement.”).  See generally 
Budden, supra note 21; Yale Kamisar, On The Fourtieth Anniversary of the Miranda 
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Taking a stance on “cutting edge”208 police ploys could signal a full-
blown retreat from Miranda or, inversely, rejuvenate Miranda at the 
expense of police investigations.  The outcome would depend on 
whether the Court supported the “custody plus” or “likely to elicit” 
interpretation of Innis.  Consequently, revisiting Innis could be a 
knockout blow to the Miranda doctrine, which has sustained several 
body blows in recent history.  If “What is ‘interrogation’?” is the scary 
question, the frightening answer is the “custody-plus” definition.209 
The Supreme Court has recently recognized Innis’ failure to 
“brighten” interrogation with well-defined boundaries.210  Dreams of 
perfect clarity under Miranda were probably doomed from the start, 
but this futility has not discouraged the Court from tending to the 
custodial half of “custodial interrogation” within the past decade.211  
The failure to decide a case whose chief issue focuses on the 
definition of interrogation is not for a lack of opportunity.212  The 
Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It–and What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 163 (2007); Michael L. Vander Giessen, Comment, Berghuis v. 
Thompkins: The Continued Erosion of Miranda’s Protections, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 189 
(2011); Charles D.  Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (1998).   
208. State v. Gibson, 422 N.W.2d 570, 577 (Neb. 1988) (“Although Gibson’s 
statement in response to the discovered and displayed revolver may be on the cutting 
edge of immeasurable imprudence, Gibson’s statement was not the product of 
interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.”). 
209. See supra note 1. 
210. “And the supposedly ‘bright’ line[] that separate[s] interrogation from 
spontaneous declaration . . . [has] turned out to be rather dim and ill defined.”  
Withrow, 507 U.S. at 711 (O’Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)).  Justice O’Connor’s criticism of 
Miranda’s “alleged brightness” was not limited to its notion of “interrogation,” but 
also to its conceptions of custody, waiver, invocation, and adequacy of warnings.  
Id.  
211. See, e.g., Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012); J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010). 
212. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 680 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 2012) (reading 
warrant aloud to suspect, “‘even if its weight might move a suspect to speak,’” was 
not impermissible psychological ploy (emphasis added) (quoting Easley v. Frey, 433 
F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2006))), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 672 (2012); Alford v. State, 
358 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (questioning during booking of suspect 
about ownership of computer flash drive found in car qualified for routine-booking 
exception to Miranda), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 122 (2012); United States v. Blake, 
571 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2009) (informing suspect that the death penalty was possible 
and commenting “‘I bet you want to talk now, huh?’” did not amount to 
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Court’s inclination to punt at every chance to revisit Innis is puzzling 
given its importance in criminal law and the inconsistency engendered 
by the confusion over Innis.213 
But why revisit interrogation now?  The privilege against self-
incrimination is ubiquitous; it applies to suspected crimes of all sizes, 
and influences everyday interactions between police and those who 
“never imagined [themselves] as the sort of person who might commit 
a crime.”214  There is scarcely a shred of evidence more significant 
than a suspect’s full confession.  As such, police are eager to 
substitute a confession for the laborious, time-consuming process of 
building a case.215  Unchecked obscurity over the bounds of 
interrogation), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1132 (2010); State v. Grant, 944 A.2d 947 
(Conn. 2008) (informing arrestee that “his blood had been found at the scene of the 
crime did not constitute interrogation under Innis”), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 916 
(2008); Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277 (D.C. 2001) (picking up drugs and 
asking suspect his name did not constitute interrogation), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 906 
(2002); Plazinich v. Lynaugh, 843 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1988) (informing the charged 
that his co-defendant had attempted to commit suicide by slashing her wrists was not 
tantamount to interrogation), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031 (1989). 
213. See supra Part IV. 
214. Lewis, supra note 14 (quoting Sergey Aleynikov, a computer 
programmer interrogated by the FBI for taking source code from Goldman Sachs).   
215. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966) (using the “third degree” 
to obtain confessions “is a short cut and makes the police lazy and unenterprising”) 
(quoting IV NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, supra note 
54); id. at 460 (“[O]ur accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the 
government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its 
own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it 
from his own mouth.” (citation omitted) (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
235-38 (1940))); see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 489 (1964) (“[A]ny 
system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to 
compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby.  
The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with 
an incomplete investigation of the other sources.” (alteration in original) (quoting 8 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 309 (3d ed. 1940))); Stein v. New York, 346 
U.S. 156, 203-04 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Heretofore constitutional rights 
have . . . constituted guarantees that are inviolable.  They have been a bulwark 
against overzealous investigators, inhuman police, and unscrupulous 
prosecutors. . . . But now it is said that if . . . there was enough evidence to convict 
regardless of the invasion of the citizen’s constitutional right, the judgment of 
conviction must stand and the defendant sent to his death.  In taking that course the 
Court chooses a short-cut which does violence to our constitutional scheme.”); 
Covey, supra note 21, at 765-66 (“The legal system’s overwhelming reliance on 
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permissible psychological ploys impedes both law enforcement and 
suspects’ access to their rights.216  Resolution of the unbridled and 
“significant disagreement” observed by Justice White is long 
overdue.217  Yet arguments to the Supreme Court that interrogation 
cases are “confusing and conflicting” have been unavailing.218 
The ideal case for review would be similar to Ferro or Lewis that 
involves the direct brandishing of evidence at a suspect.  
Unfortunately, there have been no perfect cases ripe for review in the 
past year where the interpretation of Innis is the principal 
controversy.219  The Fourth Circuit’s United States v. Johnson was an 
guilty pleas to resolve criminal charges, moreover, further elevates the importance 
of confession, since confession serves as a substitute for objective evidence of 
guilt.”). 
216. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304-05 (1980) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“[Parts of Innis] may introduce new elements of 
uncertainty; under the Court’s test, a police officer, in the brief time available, 
apparently must evaluate the suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused.  Few, if 
any, police officers are competent to make the kind of evaluation seemingly 
contemplated . . . . Trial judges have enough difficulty discerning the boundaries and 
nuances flowing from post-Miranda opinions, and we do not clarify that situation 
today.”); Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 545 (White, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision 
leaves open [several] questions . . . all of which are certain to prove productive of 
uncertainty during investigation and litigation during prosecution.”).   
217. Lewis v. Florida, 486 U.S. 1036, 1036 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
218. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Alford v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 122 (2012) (No. 11-
1318), 2012 WL 1561119, at *3 (“State and federal courts throughout the Nation 
thus recognize a booking exception but disagree sharply and widely regarding its 
scope, producing booking exception cases around the country [that] are confusing 
and conflicting.” (quoting Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 122 (2012) 
(mem.). 
219. But see United States v. Morgan, 738 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2013), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1569 (2014) (“re-advising [the suspect] of the Miranda 
rights, processing the drugs seized from her vehicle in her presence, and taking her 
photograph standing behind the seized drugs”); United States v. Woods, 711 F.3d 
737 (6th Cir. 2013) (saying “‘What’s in your pocket?’” during lawful patdown); 
United States v. Hunter, 708 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2013) (saying “‘What do you want 
me to tell these people?’” to arrested suspect who had been shot and handcuffed to 
hospital gurney).  The most factually juicy case from 2013 was from California, but 
is unpublished and not on appeal to the California Supreme Court.  See Rubio v. 
City of Hawthorne, No. B239259, 2013 WL 5762085 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2013).  
Rubio is remarkably similar to Lewis, supra Part III, and involves a videotape shown 
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intriguing case, but the Court predictably denied its petition for 
certiorari in June 2014.220  But it will not be long before a “physical 
brandishing” case materializes in a state high court or federal circuit 
court.  Given the significance of this issue and the bewilderment that 
has persisted since Innis, it is a deserving issue that the Supreme Court 
should revisit to resolve whether the “likely to elicit” or “custody 
plus” understanding of interrogation is proper.221 
B. The “likely to elicit” interpretation of interrogation should prevail 
because the teachings of Miranda are no less valuable today, and the 
“custody plus” interpretation of Innis diverges from “compulsion” as 
understood in Miranda 
Although Chief Justice Warren noted that “volunteered statements 
of any kind are not barred” by Miranda,222 he subscribed to an 
incredibly broad view of in-custody compulsion forbidden by the 
privilege against self-incrimination.223  Basically, unless a suspect 
by an officer to, ironically enough, another officer in custody who was suspected by 
his supervisor of using excessive force.  Id. at *1-2.   
220. United States v. Johnson, 734 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 82 
U.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. June 2, 2014) (No. 13-8401).  Johnson was handcuffed and 
seated in the back of a police car, when a police detective asked, “‘What do you 
mean?’” after Johnson proffered, “‘I can help you out, I don’t want to go back to 
jail, I’ve got information for you.’”  Id. at 275-77.  “Given the purpose of the 
suggested bargain, a follow-up inquiry ‘what do you mean?’ would not have seemed 
reasonably likely to elicit self-incriminating information . . . . The query would 
reasonably be expected to elicit information incriminating someone else.  But 
incriminate himself is exactly what Johnson did.”  Id. at 277. 
221. At the very least, the Court should classify individual tactics within the 
arsenal of psychological ploys available to police.  If Innis remains the definitive 
case for whether a series of provocative comments and an ongoing, question-free 
dialogue are the “functional equivalent” of interrogation, the Court should consider 
brandishing physical evidence before a suspect, verbally reciting truthful or 
fabricated evidence against a suspect, notifying the suspect of charges, and 
suggesting the benefits of cooperating with police.  See discussion supra Part IV.  
222. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). 
223. Id. at 478 (“Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any 
compelling influence is, of course, admissible in evidence.” (emphasis added)); see 
also id. at 463 (“[A] confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever 
may have been the character of the compulsion . . . .” (quoting Bram v. United 
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897))); id. at 513 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s 
unspoken assumption that any pressure violates the privilege is not supported by the 
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would have made the same confession to his or her own shadow, the 
confession is “compelled” if obtained in “the interrogation 
environment.”224  This is why Miranda required warnings and a 
waiver to restore the competitive balance in custody—where police 
have an overwhelming home field advantage. 
Chief Justice Warren’s obsession with the use of “psychological 
ploys” and trickery225 to extract confessions in the “police-dominated 
atmosphere” has been lost in many post-Innis cases discussing 
interrogation.226  Courts using the “custody plus” definition of 
interrogation desire an added “measure of compulsion” before 
excluding statements, yet rarely indicate what types of behavior go 
“above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.”227  Is it torture?  Is 
it “browbeating, violence, threats or intimidation”?228  Is it saying, 
“‘Happy Birthday’”?229  This extrinsic requirement is completely at 
odds with compulsion as understood in Miranda: any “police 
conduct . . . designed and likely to pressure or persuade, or even ‘to 
exert a tug on,’ a suspect to incriminate himself.”230 
Even if its application is inescapably complicated, the “likely to 
elicit definition” created in Innis is not: “interrogation” is “any words 
or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”231  This 
definition works in tandem with the inherent pressures faced by 
suspects in custody and seemingly forbids a whole range of devious 
police practices.232  Once police officers are actively building a case 
precedents and it has failed to show why the Fifth Amendment prohibits that 
relatively mild pressure the Due Process Clause permits.” (emphasis added)); id. at 
532 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority found “no statement obtained 
from [a] defendant [in custody] can truly be the product of his free choice” 
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
224. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
225. See id. at 454-61. 
226. See discussion supra Part IV. 
227. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). 
228. People v. Ferro, 472 N.E. 2d 13, 17 (N.Y. 1984) (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
229. Murray v. State, 864 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). 
230. Kamisar, supra note 49, at 23 (footnote omitted) (quoting Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
231. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. 
232. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-74 (1966). 
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against a suspect, it becomes outlandish to argue that they should not 
have known any suggestive action would produce an incriminating 
response.  At that point, police words and actions likely have an 
agenda to produce such an incriminating response. 
Virtually any suggestive conduct performed by police in view of a 
suspect in custody is likely to generate some response, which would 
mean that all but the most uninitiated or improbable reactions by 
suspects are inadmissible.  When the custodial suspect has an 
“impair[ed] capacity for rational judgment” and is desperate to explain 
him or herself,233 nearly any police comments concerning the crime 
are likely to produce a response.  This tendency prevails whether those 
comments are inflammatory, provocative, or ordinarily innocuous.  
The same is true for the brandishing of physical evidence or 
communication of verbal evidence.  But the result in Innis is at odds 
with this notion, and seems to be at odds with its own definition.  As a 
result, courts regularly shrug their shoulders and find that 
interrogation has not occurred simply because the alternative would be 
so incompatible with the result in Innis.234 
The Ferro/Cunningham paradigm demonstrates the elasticity of 
the “likely to elicit” definition in assessing the permissible bounds of 
interrogation.235  A low bar for interrogation preserves the 
“prophylactic” nature of Miranda’s protections.236  Meanwhile, the 
rigid “custody plus” definition clashes with the “likely to elicit” 
233. See, e.g., Rubio v. City of Hawthorne, No. B239259, 2013 WL 5762085, 
at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2013) (“[Officer] Catano made Rubio repeatedly watch 
the surveillance video in his presence, and Rubio testified he felt he needed to 
explain his actions in light of Catano’s stated disapproval of them.”). 
234. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Quarles, 720 S.E.2d 84, 89 (Va. 2012) 
(“Even assuming, arguendo, some measure of compulsion, at best it was of the 
subtle variety approved by the United States Supreme Court and therefore 
acceptable under Innis.”); State v. Tucker, 692 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Ohio 1998) (“The 
concept of ‘functional equivalent of questioning’ compulsion would have to be 
extended beyond its recognized boundaries as explained in Innis in order that 
‘functional equivalent’ compulsion sufficient to invoke the Miranda principles be 
found on the facts of this case.”). 
235. People v. Ferro, 472 N.E.2d 13 (N.Y. 1984); State v. Cunningham, 423 
N.W.2d 862 (1988).  See supra notes 154-65 (Ferro), 180-89 (Cunningham) and 
accompanying text.  
236. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690 (1993) (“[W]e have sometimes 
called the Miranda safeguards ‘prophylactic’ in nature.”).   
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definition’s adaptability to the circumstances.  If a court is searching 
for a “measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in 
custody itself,”237 it is unlikely to find anything.  It is almost like 
looking for chocolate on the inside of a candy bar: there may be no 
more than nougat, caramel, and peanuts inside the chocolaty exterior, 
but the bar itself is already dripping in chocolate.  The Miranda Court 
found that the pressures surrounding custody itself were enough to 
sufficiently undermine a suspect’s willpower.238 
To add an extra coercion-based element that occurs inside that 
custody comes perilously close to collapsing “interrogation” into the 
voluntariness regime that the majority repudiated in Miranda239 and 
prominent scholars criticized as “inherently subjective.”240  Under 
237. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). 
238. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966) (“Unless adequate 
protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of 
his free choice.” (emphasis added)).   
239. See id. at 458-67.   
240. White, supra note 52, at 1210.  Under the voluntariness doctrine, a 
confession was admissible as long as the suspect made it voluntarily, as determined 
by the totality of the circumstances.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 462-65.  If 
interrogation requires custody plus “a measure of compulsion above and beyond that 
inherent in custody itself,” Innis, 446 U.S. at 300, then courts must look at the 
circumstances beyond that of custody.  Considering custody would likely 
accompany an involuntary confession by default, looking at the circumstances of 
custody for an additional measure of compulsion is no different than looking at the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding a confession (which is identical to 
voluntariness).  Unsurprisingly, opinions adhering to the custody plus definition of 
interrogation are reminiscent of pre-Miranda voluntariness opinions.  Compare State 
v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721, 733 (Ariz. 1965), overruled by Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436 
(“The facts and circumstances in the instant case show that the statement was 
voluntary, made by defendant of his own free will, that no threats or use of force or 
coercion or promise of immunity were made; and that he understood his legal right 
and the statement might be used against him.”), and Lewis v. State, 509 So. 2d 
1236, 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (“It may be that the police should have known 
that showing the appellant the evidence against him would be likely to elicit an 
incriminating response.  However, the circumstances of this case support the 
conclusion that from the appellant’s perspective such police procedure did not 
impinge upon his will in a coercive manner.” (emphasis added)), with People v. 
Ferro, 472 N.E.2d 13, 17 (N.Y. 1984) (“Bearing in mind the placing of the furs 
before Ferro, the absence of further warnings to him and the relatively short time 
elapsed between his refusal to answer questions and the placing of the furs, we 
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Miranda, “interrogation” ought to be understood as any 
“technique . . . of persuasion” in custody.241  The entire import of the 
“custody prong” is that it is improper to use that custody to obtain 
confessions.  This policy sufficiently explains the “above and beyond” 
language in Innis, not that “interrogation” requires a sort of “super-
custodial” state.  For these reasons, the Supreme Court should revisit 
interrogation as understood in Innis and affirm the “likely to elicit” 
definition of interrogation. 
At the same time it re-adopts the “likely to elicit” understanding 
of interrogation, the Court should outline factors for the “likely to 
elicit” analysis.  In the time since Innis, an ocean of case law 
percolated to help the Court select these factors.242  With care not to 
infuse subjectivity into the inquiry, the officer’s objective intent 
should be a factor in an interrogation analysis.243  If a technique is 
purposefully calculated or devised as in Ferro, there is no reason to 
conclude that Ferro’s right to cut off questioning was not scrupulously honored.” 
(emphasis added)).  
241. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461 (“An individual swept from familiar 
surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected 
to the techniques of persuasion described [in Miranda] cannot be otherwise than 
under compulsion to speak.” (emphasis added)).   
242. See supra Part IV.  
243. The stressed importance of officer intent is partially inspired by Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Innis, and Professor Welsh White’s view that the officer’s 
purpose should play a role in the objective determination of “reasonably likely.”  See 
Innis, 446 U.S. at 309-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Apparent attempts to elicit 
information from a suspect after he has invoked his right to cut off questioning 
necessarily demean that right and tend to reinstate the imbalance between police and 
suspect that the Miranda warnings are designed to correct.”); White, supra note 52, 
at 1225-31; see also Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n.7 (“This is not to say that the intent of 
the police is irrelevant, for it may well have a bearing on whether the police should 
have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an 
incriminating response.  In particular, where a police practice is designed to elicit an 
incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also 
be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that 
effect.”).  The proposed factor would not be unlike other aspects of criminal law 
where the officer’s objective purpose or intent is relevant.  See, e.g., Florida v. 
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416-17 (2013) (“[T]he question before the court is 
precisely whether the officer’s conduct was an objectively reasonable search.  As we 
have described, that depends upon whether the officers had an implied license to 
enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they entered.  
Here, their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a search . . . .”). 
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ignore officers’ apparent manipulation of captivity to obtain 
confessions.244  Location is undoubtedly an important factor, as 
suspects are less susceptible to custodial pressures at home than in the 
confines of the police station.245  Additional factors should include: 
the length of the police interaction;246 any known susceptibility of the 
defendant;247 whether the suspect was brought in “for questioning”;248 
what safeguards police took to prevent an incriminating response 
(including Miranda warnings);249 the prevalence of a technique within 
law enforcement or its renown as an interrogation technique;250 and 
any other factors the Court deems important.  If police are involved in 
ongoing lawful Fourth Amendment activity while a suspect is custody, 
it should disfavor a finding of interrogation.251  Summarily, the Court 
should emphasize that the functional equivalent of interrogation 
244. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rubio, 540 N.E.2d 189, 193 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1989) (Defendant’s statement to officers who showed him cocaine while seated in 
kitchen chair surrounded by officers was not “spontaneous,” but a “verbal response 
to a purposeful technique calculated to obtain information that could be used against 
the defendant.”).  But see Kennedy v. State, 540 S.E.2d 229, 230-31 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2000) (officer’s picking up and inspection of two pieces of crack cocaine at police 
station did not amount to “the type of tricks or psychological ploys” cited by the 
Supreme Court in Innis). 
245. Most significantly, wide latitude should be granted to general on-the-
scene questioning performed as a routine part of officer duties, both pre- and post-
arrest.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477 (“General on-the-scene questioning as to facts 
surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding 
process is not affected by our holding.”). 
246. Innis, 446 U.S. at 303. 
247. Id. 
248. Or, generally, what was the apparent justification for the interaction.  
Striking up a conversation in transit is different than chatting with an incarcerated 
suspect from his cell to an interrogation room.  If the purpose of the entire 
interaction between police and the suspect is “for questioning,” it’s already a 
contrived setting where it is difficult to argue that an incriminating response is 
unlikely.  See, e.g., Drury v. State, 793 A.2d 567, 569 (Md. 2002).   
249. See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 858 A.2d 435, 447 (D.C. 2004) (“The 
detective’s instruction that ‘[n]obody [is] to advise him of his rights until I do’ 
underscores the plan to intimidate appellant by purposely withholding the 
advisement of rights meant to counteract the pressure inherent in custodial 
interrogation required by the Supreme Court in Miranda.” (alterations in original)). 
250. See, e.g., id. at 444 (“The tripartite approach evident here combines 
classic interrogation techniques.”). 
251. See, e.g., State v. Moody, 974 N.E.2d 1273, 1278 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).   
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occurs whenever more factors of deception are present, thus 
construing the Fifth Amendment to be as “broad as the mischief 
against which it seeks to guard.”252 
These factors accommodate the credible and popular “interplay” 
theory of custodial interrogation253 while preserving the distinct 
inquiries into custody and interrogation, and sufficiently account for 
the psychological ploys feared by the Miranda majority.254  Most 
importantly, this approach to interrogation embraces the spirit of 
Miranda and placates its chief concern: “that the ‘interrogation 
environment’ created by the interplay of interrogation and custody” 
would undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination 
by “subjugat[ing] the individual to the will of his examiner.”255  By 
endorsing the “likely to elicit” definition of “interrogation,” the 
Supreme Court would reaffirm that the Miranda safeguards function 
to prevent “using the coercive nature of confinement to extract 
confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained 
environment.”256  Though imperfect, a Court-sanctioned interpretation 
252. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966).   
253. The “interplay” school of custody originates from language in Innis and 
Yale Kamisar’s article discussing the “interplay” theory.  See Innis, 446 U.S. at 299 
(“The concern of the Court in Miranda was that the “interrogation environment” 
created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would ‘subjugate the individual 
to the will of the examiner’ and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination.”); Yale Kamisar, supra note 49, at 63-65; see also Yeager, supra 
note 21, at 49-50 (“‘Synergy’ describes how two forces, acting together, create a 
whole system in which each element acts in a manner unpredicted by the behavior of 
its parts taken separately.”). 
254. There is an argument to be made that the interplay approach is better 
reasoned than distinct inquiries into custody and interrogation.  But a more carefully 
crafted approach to interrogation can accomplish substantially the same objectives in 
a less holistic, abstract manner, with the added benefit of having pre-existing case 
law.  Rehabilitating “interrogation and its functional equivalent” can establish the 
desired uniformity across jurisdictions while maintaining the binary analyses of 
custody and interrogation.   
255. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58).   
256. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1987).  See also Drury v. State, 
793 A.2d 567, 571 (Md. 2002) (“It appears to us that the only reasonable conclusion 
that can be drawn from the foregoing facts is that the officer should have known, in 
light of his having told petitioner that he was being brought in for questioning, that 
putting the evidence before petitioner and telling him that the items were going to be 
fingerprinted was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from him.  
The only plausible explanation for the officer’s conduct is that he expected to elicit a 
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of Innis would greatly improve consistency in lower courts and help 
resolve the “significant disagreement” observed by Justice White in 
Lewis, without demolishing Miranda’s foundation for modern 
criminal procedure.257 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Chief among the rights granted to the accused is the right to be 
free from compelled self-incrimination.258  Criminal investigations 
frequently wrestle with this privilege because of a confession’s weight 
and importance as “the most compelling possible evidence of 
guilt.”259  Yet the Supreme Court has permitted the “significant 
disagreement”260 created by the “likely to elicit” and “custody plus” 
interpretations261 of Innis to propagate unabated.262  Instead of giving 
a frightening answer, the Supreme Court has declined to answer the 
scary question: What is “interrogation,” anyway? 
statement from petitioner.” (emphasis added)); State v. Cunningham, 423 N.W.2d 
862, 865 (Wis. 1988) (“Miranda procedures are designed to protect a suspect in 
custodial situations where the compulsion to confess may be present.”). 
257. What is more difficult, perhaps, is accounting for the elephant in the 
interrogation room: that Innis’ result still seems inconsistent with the definition it 
institutes.  This could be deftly done by emphasizing the especially unusual 
circumstances in Innis, specifically that the officers were voicing their concerns 
while they were actually in the neighborhood where the gun was located, making it 
“entirely understandable that [the officers] would voice their concern [for the safety 
of the handicapped children] to each other.”  Innis, 446 U.S. at 303 n.9 (alterations 
in original).  Basically, the officers’ comments were less deceptive and less 
demanding of a response because they came in an unusually appropriate setting at an 
unusually appropriate time.  Innis’ circumstances—a suspect in transit who police 
arrested at large in a neighborhood where the gun was believed to be—are 
exceptionally rare and make the officers’ comments more excusable.  In this way, 
the Court could affirm the Innis definition while diminishing the precedential value 
of its holding to a very narrow scenario. 
258. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
259. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466; see also supra Part II.A. 
260. Lewis v. Florida, 486 U.S. 1036, 1036 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial to certiorari). 
261. The “custody plus” definition is a creature of case law observed in this 
note.  These terms are defined in Part III.A.  See supra notes 132-33. 
262. See supra Part IV. 
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Despite the potentially severe consequences for the present state 
of the law,263 the Supreme Court must answer this “substantial 
question”264 of criminal procedure to settle important issues, such as 
whether presenting a suspect with physical evidence of a crime is a 
lawful police practice.265  The fundamental significance of Miranda v. 
Arizona is that custodial interrogation is “at odds with one of our 
Nation’s most cherished principles—that the individual may not be 
compelled to incriminate himself.”266  Unlike miracles or acts of God, 
American laws should be judged on their merit,267 and Miranda’s 
constitutional merit endures in the face of eroding support.  “For the 
strength of our system lies in how durable it is, even for our most 
heinous citizens.”268 
263. See supra Part V.A. 
264. Lewis, 486 U.S. at 1036 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial to 
certiorari). 
265. See supra Part IV. 
266. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966). 
267. PULP FICTION, supra note 1 (“You don’t judge . . . this based on merit.  
Now whether or not what we experienced was, an according-to-Hoyle ‘miracle,’ is 
insignificant.  But what is significant is that I felt the ‘touch of God’—God got 
involved.”). 
268. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast 
Apr. 24, 2013), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-april-24-
2013/weak-constitution (at 1:10).  See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480 
(1966) (“‘The quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely measured by the 
methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law.’” (quoting Walter V. 
Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARVARD L. REV. 1, 26 
(1956))); Andre Mathis, Comment, Criminal Law—State v. Sawyer, Tennessee 
Supreme Court Holds That a Police Officer Cannot Read an Affidavit to a Person in 
Custody Without Giving Miranda Warnings, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 1171, 1183 (2006) 
(“The purpose of the Bill of Rights was, and still is, to protect the rights of the 
people; and courts should continue to expand individual rights, as the court did in 
Sawyer, rather than narrow individual rights.”).  But see Stephen B. Segal, Note, The 
Law Court’s Proper Application of Miranda in State v. Bragg: A “Matter-of-Fact 
Communication” to the Defendant Regarding Evidence Against Him Will not 
Typically Constitute “Interrogation,” 65 ME. L. REV. 823, 836 (2013) (“The Bragg 
holding—that a police officer’s statement conveying only ‘matter-of-fact 
communication of evidence’ to a defendant will not trigger a Miranda warning—is a 
continuation of the Law Court’s tradition of striking the proper balance between 
investigative needs and rights of defendants.”) (referring to State v. Bragg, 48 A.3d 
769 (2012)).   
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The “custody plus” interpretation of Innis is at odds with 
compulsion as understood in Miranda.  In Miranda, Chief Justice 
Warren spoke forebodingly of “tricks” and “ploys” wielded by police 
to forge a “psychological advantage.”269  Through this lens, the Court 
viewed “compulsion” in custody as a virtually unlimited notion that 
includes any police conduct with a modicum of persuasion (even the 
“subtle” variety).270  Tricks and games on law enforcement’s home 
field are not an acceptable substitute for justice, but a “short cut” for 
the potentially decisive evidence.271 
Amending an additional compulsion-based element “above and 
beyond” custody to interrogation grants police the liberty to engage in 
the sorts of shenanigans of which the Miranda Court would have 
disapproved.272  This supplemental “measure of compulsion” remains 
judicially undefined, so that a court employing the “custody plus” 
definition of interrogation would likely admit the proffered evidence 
barring a sort of super-custodial state, or the use of flagrantly coercive 
tactics.273  The fuzzy notion of “custody plus” comes perilously close 
to the voluntariness inquiry repudiated in Miranda.274 
The “likely to elicit” definition, on the other hand, honors the 
tradition followed in Miranda that the privilege against self-
incrimination “has always been ‘as broad as the mischief against 
which it seeks to guard.’”275  It defies common sense to suggest that 
asking, “Where were you on the night of the fifteenth?” would offend 
the Constitution, but showing a video of what occurred that same 
night would not.276  Nor should the lack of a question mark obviate 
269. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-57; see also supra Part V. 
270. Id. at 474. 
271. Id. at 447 (“‘[The use of third degree tactics] is a short cut and makes the 
police lazy and unenterprising.’” (quoting IV NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE 
& ENFORCEMENT, supra note 54)).   
272. See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text; Part V.B. 
273. See supra text accompanying notes 239-44. 
274. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 462-68. 
275. Id. at 459-60 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892)). 
276. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 509 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); see 
also People v. Ferro, 472 N.E.2d 13, 17 (“Where . . . the only possible object of the 
police action in revealing evidence to a defendant is to elicit a statement from him, it 
does no violence to logic to conclude that the police should have known that it 
would do so.” (citations omitted)).  
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interrogation by way of a crafty manipulation of punctuation.277  
Because the “custody plus” definition of interrogation derived from 
Innis is inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment as understood in 
Miranda,278 it should be abandoned in favor of the “likely to elicit” 
definition ostensibly created in Rhode Island v. Innis.279 
 
Kyle C. Welch* 
277. People v. White, 828 N.W.2d 329, 342 (“[Certain] statements do not 
magically transform what would otherwise be an express question into a 
constitutionally benign comment.  For example, the statement ‘I’m not asking you a 
question, I’m just telling you I want to know why you killed those people’ would 
clearly be an express question under Miranda and Innis because it invites a 
response, regardless of the interrogator’s use of a lead-in statement.”). 
278. “The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with [the 
principle] . . . that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself.”  
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58.  But see id. at 526 (White, J., dissenting) (“The 
proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody 
interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority opinion and without a 
clear waiver of counsel has no significant support in the history of the privilege or in 
the language of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
279. While restoring the spirit of the “likely to elicit” definition, the Court 
should take care to distance itself from the “above and beyond” dicta, which 
distinguished statements obtained via interrogation from totally volunteered 
statements, and the Court should also provide a set of factors to aid future courts in 
applying the “likely to elicit” definition of interrogation as proposed in Part V.  See 
supra Part V. 
         * J.D. 2014, California Western School of Law; B.S. Mechanical Engineering 
2011, The Ohio State University. I would like to thank Professor Daniel Yeager for 
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